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PLAYING OUTSIDE THE JOINTS:   
WHERE THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
RESTORATION ACT MEETS TITLE VII 
AMANDA BRENNAN* 
As the nation is grappling with rancorous identity wars, some are looking to 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as both a shield and sword.  
What was once a permissible federal religious accommodation has become an 
impermissible religious endorsement.  This Comment argues that the Supreme 
Court's recent expansion of RFRA, as applied to Title VII of the 1964 Civil 
Rights Act, violates the Establishment Clause.  RFRA not only provides 
employers immunity from Title  VII, it allows employers to utilize the judiciary 
to coerce lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) employees to conform to the 
employers’ religious beliefs.  In providing employers religious exemptions from 
Title VII, the judiciary coerces religious conformance and endorses religion.  
However blurred the boundaries of the Establishment Clause are, it clearly 
prohibits such government action.  
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INTRODUCTION 
You just returned from your honeymoon with your new wife.  You 
are excited to get back to work, but when you arrive, you notice your 
name is no longer outside of your office and your key does not fit in 
the lock.  You go to the Vice President to demand answers.  He tells 
you that both his faith in God and the Christian Bible have taught him 
that marriage is between a man and a woman.  He cannot, in 
accordance with his faith, let you, the closeted lesbian who has helped 
build this company, continue to be a part of his team.  You are fired. 
After a few days of shock, you file a charge with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).  You claim that the 
company unlawfully discriminated against you, and therefore violated 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  The EEOC investigates your case 
and finds reasonable cause to believe the company unlawfully 
discriminated against you.  After months of investigating, the EEOC 
files a suit against the company.  At trial, the company argues that 
requiring it to retain a homosexual employee violates its sincerely held 
religious beliefs.  Under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA),1 the company should be exempt from Title VII’s prohibition 
on employment discrimination.  At the end of the trial, the court holds 
that requiring the company to maintain you as an employee violates 
the company’s sincerely held religious beliefs.  Further, because the 
EEOC failed to show that requiring the company maintain you as an 
employee is the least burdensome recourse, the company is exempt 
from Title VII.  You lost. 
While the scenario above is hypothetical, it is far from conjectural.  
RFRA prevents the government from substantially burdening a 
person’s religious exercise2 unless the government can pass strict 
scrutiny by demonstrating:  (i) it has a compelling interest in applying 
the law to the person, and (ii) it is using the least restrictive means of 
achieving that interest.3  Therefore, if a federal statute or regulation 
substantially burdens an individual’s religious exercise, even if 
unintentionally, the government must satisfy strict scrutiny or it must 
exempt the individual from the burdensome statute or regulation.4 
                                               
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–2000bb-4 (2012). 
 2. See § 2000bb-1(a) (“Government shall not substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability . . . .”). 
 3. § 2000bb-1(b)(1)–(2). 
 4. § 2000bb-1(c); see also Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 
2761 (stating that “[i]f the Government substantially burdens a person’s exercise of 
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In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.,5 the Supreme Court held that the 
judiciary is not capable of measuring the substantiality of the burden a 
government action has on religious exercise.6  Rather, courts can only 
inquire into whether the religious objector honestly believes that the 
government is substantially burdening his religious exercise.7  Further, 
the Court held that closely held, for-profit corporations are “person[s]” 
under RFRA, whose religious exercise RFRA therefore protects.8 
The Hobby Lobby decision represents an extreme expansion of 
religious liberty.  First, by deeming itself incompetent to decide 
whether the government substantially burdened religious exercise, the 
Court eliminated the threshold question used to determine whether 
strict scrutiny should be applied.9  So long as a person honestly believes 
the government is burdening his religious exercise, strict scrutiny must 
apply.10  Additionally, by expanding RFRA protections to corporations, 
the Court effectively provided exemptions from laws specifically 
designed to circumscribe corporate power and protect individuals 
from harmful corporate conduct.11 
This directly implicates Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,12 which 
prohibits employers from taking adverse employment actions against 
employees because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin;13 
                                               
religion, under the [RFRA] that person is entitled to an exemption from the rule” 
(citing City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997))). 
 5. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 6. See id. at 2779 (announcing that the “narrow function” of the Court in 
analyzing RFRA issues is to determine whether the line drawn between the religious 
belief and objectionable act reflects an “honest conviction” (quoting Thomas v. Review 
Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981))). 
 7. Id.  
 8. See id. at 2768–75 (rejecting both the argument that closely held for-profit 
corporations are not “people,” and the argument that corporations do not have the 
ability to exercise religion). 
 9. The word “substantially” was added to clarify that the compelling interest test 
should only be applied to government actions that substantially burden religious 
exercise.  See 139 CONG. REC. 26180 (statement of Sen. Hatch) (“It does not require 
the Government to justify every action that has some effect on religious exercise.”).  
Thus, whether RFRA applies depends on whether the government substantially 
burdened religious exercise.  For further discussion, see infra note 107 and 
accompanying text. 
 10. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779. 
 11. See Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453, 1458 (2015) 
(arguing that the Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby has ushered in an era of Free Exercise 
Lochnerism, in which religious liberty is used as a conduit for corporate deregulation). 
 12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012). 
 13. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
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and, is particularly relevant to claims of employment discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity.14  Unlike race, 
lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) status is seen as a choice by 
some judges,15 and even if it is not, the outward projection of this status 
is partially within control of the employee.  Therefore, rather than 
requiring the employer to maintain a flamboyant LGBT employee, a 
less restrictive alternative is to require the employee to present in a 
more hetero-normative or cis-normative manner while at work.16  
This Comment argues that applying RFRA, as construed by the 
Supreme Court, to Title VII violates the Establishment Clause.17  Part I 
reviews the evolution of religious accommodation under the Free 
Exercise Clause,18 the recent expansion of religious accommodation 
under RFRA, and the simultaneous expansion of LGBT protections.19  
Additionally, Part I explores the inevitable clash between LGBT and 
religious rights as exemplified in EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral 
Homes, Inc.20  Finally, Part I explores how the Court has traversed the 
fine line between permissible religious accommodation under the Free 
Exercise Clause and impermissible religious endorsement under the 
Establishment Clause.21 
Part II argues that applying RFRA, as construed by the Supreme 
Court, to Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination constitutes a 
government action that compels LGBT employees to conform to the 
religious ideology of their employer, and therefore violates the 
                                               
 14. The EEOC has interpreted Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination to also 
prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sexual orientation.  See infra 
Section I.C. 
 15. According to one judge, “[s]ome gay individuals adopt what various 
commentators have referred to as the gay ‘social identity’ but experience a variety of 
sexual desires.”  Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th Cir. 2017) (Pryor, 
J., concurring) (citing E.J. Graff, What’s Wrong with Choosing to Be Gay?, THE NATION 
(Feb. 3, 2014); Brandon Ambrosino, I Wasn’t Born This Way.  I Choose to Be Gay, THE 
NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 28, 2014)). 
 16. See infra Section II.A.2 (showing how Hobby Lobby ignored pre-Smith cases to 
better protect employers over employees). 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. I (prohibiting the federal government from establishing 
a state religion). 
 18. Id. (reserving the right of citizens to accept any religious belief and engage in 
any religious ritual); see infra Section I.A. 
 19. See infra Section I.C. 
 20. 201 F. Supp. 3d 837 (E.D. Mich. 2016), rev’d, 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), 
petition for cert. docketed, No. 18-107 (U.S. July 24, 2018); see also infra Section I.D. 
 21. See infra Part I. 
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Establishment Clause.22  Additionally, Part II argues that RFRA 
accommodations from Title VII violate the fundamental principle of 
neutrality23 and are therefore an impermissible endorsement.24  To 
support these assertions, Part II analyzes the application of RFRA to 
Title VII by examining the Harris Funeral Homes decision.25  This 
Comment concludes that the Establishment Clause provides a natural 
limit to the Court’s broad expansion of religious freedom under RFRA, 
and applying RFRA to Title VII exceeds this limitation.26 
I.    BACKGROUND 
A.   The Free Exercise Clause and Religious Accommodation 
The First Amendment states, “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof.”27  Though the First Amendment specifically refers to Congress, 
it restricts all three branches, including the judiciary, from infringing on 
these rights.28  Thus, if any branch acts beyond its authority by 
burdening an individual’s religious exercise, that individual may seek 
exemption from the unjustified imposition.29  
The Free Exercise Clause protects only beliefs and practices that are 
religious, and that protection is not infallible.  This Section explains 
what protections are afforded under the Free Exercise Clause.  
Section I.A.1 explores the Court’s rules for determining whether a 
                                               
 22. See infra Section II.A. 
 23. See infra notes 215–221 (explaining accommodations must be neutral, neither 
favoring one religious over another, nor favoring religion generally). 
 24. See infra Section II.A. 
 25. See infra Section II.A.2. 
 26. See infra Conclusion. 
 27. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 28. As Justice Black eloquently explained: 
[t]he amendments were offered to curtail and restrict the general powers 
granted to the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial Branches two years before 
in the original Constitution.  The Bill of Rights changed the original 
Constitution into a new charter under which no branch of government could 
abridge the people’s freedoms of press, speech, religion, and assembly. 
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 716 (1971) (Black, J., concurring); see also 1 
ANNALS OF CONG. 437 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison) (explaining 
that the purpose of favoring particular rights within the Constitution is to “limit and qualify 
the powers of Government, by excepting out of the grant of power those cases in which the 
Government ought not to act, or to act only in a particular mode”). 
 29. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 409–10 (1963) (providing religious 
exemption from a state’s employment benefit law). 
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belief or practice is religious.  Section I.A.2 explains what restrictions 
on religious exercise are permissible under the Free Exercise Clause.  
This Section begins by delineating the Court’s incongruent Free 
Exercise Clause jurisprudence leading up to its seminal decision in 
Employment Division v. Smith,30 where it held that the Free Exercise 
Clause does not require the government to provide religious 
accommodation from neutral, generally applicable laws.31  The Section 
concludes by clarifying what restrictions are permissible post-Smith. 
1. Defining religious exercise 
The Free Exercise Clause protects two rights:  “the right to believe 
and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires” and the right to 
perform, or abstain from performing, physical acts engaged in for 
religious reasons.32  The right to believe is absolute, but the right to act 
is not.33  Thus, the government may not compel an individual to 
subscribe to a particular religious tenet; however, in some circumstances 
                                               
 30. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (2012). 
 31. Emp’t Div., 494 U.S. at 878. 
 32. Id. at 877. 
 33. At the time of ratification, both James Madison and Thomas Jefferson 
recognized that the right to free exercise was not absolute.  See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 
(Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison) (explaining that none of the 
proposed amendments, including what is now the First Amendment, should be 
construed as limitations on other protected rights); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to 
the Danbury Baptist Association, 1 January 1802, FOUNDERS ONLINE, 
https://founders.archives.gov/?q=danbury%20baptists&s=1111311111&r=5 (last 
visited Dec. 3, 2018) (expressing his understanding that under the recently ratified 
First Amendment, “the legitimate powers of government reach actions only, [and] not 
opinions” and, therefore, no citizen has any right superior to his social duties).  Early 
cases recognized the power of government to regulate conduct in order to protect 
society.  See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940) (noting that states may 
enact nondiscriminatory laws to “safeguard the peace, good order and comfort of the 
community”); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (illustrating that if 
the government were unable to regulate religious conduct, it would have no authority 
to protect against individuals who believe their religion to require human sacrifice or 
suicide).  Though religious belief is protected under the Free Exercise Clause, the 
early cases suggest that this protection derived from the Establishment Clause.  See Sch. 
Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (noting that in of all the cases brought 
before the Court in the previous ten years, the Court consistently held that the 
Establishment Clause withdrew all legislative power respective of religious belief); 
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303–04 (explaining that between the two objectives of the First 
Amendment—preventing the government from compelling individuals to accept and 
practice any religion, and protecting the freedom to practice a chosen religion—the 
freedom to practice may be regulated by the government “for the protection of society”). 
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the government may prohibit him from acting in accordance with the 
particular religious tenets to which he does subscribe.34 
Whether belief or conduct, the Free Exercise Clause protects only 
those that are religious.35  Because the right to religious belief is 
absolute, the Supreme Court has proceeded cautiously in rejecting an 
individual’s claim that his beliefs are religious,36 giving great deference 
to the individual.37  
While there is no clear definition of religion, the Supreme Court has 
established some standards that guide the determination of whether a 
particular belief or action is religious.38  First, the Free Exercise Clause 
protects beliefs not associated with a god or any established religion so 
long as they occupy the same place in the life of the religious objector 
as would an orthodox belief in god.39  Further, if a person’s beliefs are 
                                               
 34. See Emp’t Div., 494 U.S. at 877, 879 (noting that the First Amendment excludes 
government regulation of religious beliefs, but rejecting the contention that a person’s 
religious conduct must be excluded from such regulation). 
 35. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indep. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713 (1981). 
 36. See e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1972) (emphasizing that the 
“determination of what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice entitled to constitutional 
protection . . . present[s] a most delicate question”). 
 37. See Timothy L. Hall, Note, The Sacred and the Profane:  A First Amendment Definition 
of Religion, 61 TEX. L. REV. 139, 160 (1982) (asserting that defining “religion” is a 
classification problem whereby “any definition inevitably will exclude some activities 
from protected status” and, therefore, risk violating the Establishment Clause); Sharon 
L. Worthing, “Religion” and “Religious Institutions” Under the First Amendment, 7 PEPP. L. REV. 
313, 345–46 (1980) (arguing that giving the government power to define what 
constitutes a “church” would violate the Establishment Clause by empowering the 
government to create a definition that discriminates against disfavored religions and 
religious minorities); see also Sandy Levinson, Justice Ginsburg’s Inexplicable First Two Pages, 
BALKINIZATION (June 30, 2014), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/06/justice-
ginsburgs-inexpecable-first-two.html (“‘Because this is the way I feel seems to be a 
conclusive argument in the religions realm . . . .”). 
 38. Some of these guidelines stem from the Court’s attempt to construct a 
permissible statutory definition of religion, while others reflect the Court’s 
understanding that it is incompetent to appraise the religiosity of a claimed belief.  See 
infra notes 39–51 and accompanying text. 
 39. In Unites States v. Seeger, the Court was called upon to construe § 6 (j) of the 
Military Training and Service Act (MTSA), which exempts from combat training 
“persons who by reason of their religious training and belief are conscientiously 
opposed to participation in war in any form.”  380 U.S. 163, 164–65 (1965).  MTSA 
defined “religious training and belief” as “an individual’s belief in a relation to a 
Supreme Being involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation, 
but [not including] essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely 
personal moral code.”  Id. at 165 (alteration in original).  The Court held that, under 
MTSA, the test to determine whether a belief is “in relation to a Supreme Being,” and 
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associated with an established religion, the person’s religious beliefs 
do not have to align with the dominant views of his religion.40  To hold 
otherwise would require courts to determine whose perception of the 
religious commands are correct, a task entirely outside of the judicial 
function and competency.41  Second, courts may not question the truth 
or verity of religious doctrines or beliefs; rather, courts may only 
question whether the belief is sincerely held.42 
Finally, courts may not question whether religious beliefs are 
reasonable.43  In Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security 
Division,44 Thomas, a Jehovah’s Witness, challenged the denial of his 
unemployment benefits under the Free Exercise Clause.45  Thomas was 
assigned to work in the production of turrets for military tanks.46  When 
he realized the turrets would be used in war, Thomas ultimately quit, 
claiming that contributing to the production of weapons violated his 
religion.47  At an administrative hearing, Thomas testified that he 
believed that he could work in the production of raw material that 
might ultimately be used for the production of tanks without violating 
                                               
is therefore religious, is whether such belief is “sincere and meaningful [and] occupies 
a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God 
of one who clearly qualifies for the exemption.”  Id. at 165–66.  In his concurrence, 
Justice Douglas explained that the Court’s’ interpretation brings MTSA in line with 
the Free Exercise Clause, intimating that the First Amendment protects sincere beliefs 
not associated with a God or any established religion, so long as they occupy the same 
place in the life of the objector as would an orthodox belief in God.  See id. at 188, 192–
93 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 40. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715–16 (“[T]he guarantee of free exercise is not limited 
to beliefs which are shared by all members of a religious sect.”); see also Frazee v. Ill. 
Dep’t of Emp’t Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 834 (1989) (accepting an individual’s objection to 
working on Sundays as religious, even though others of his and similar religions did 
not have such a proscription). 
 41. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716 (holding that the function of the court is to find if the 
terminated worker had an honest religious conviction, not to act as arbiters of 
scriptural interpretation). 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (holding that the First 
Amendment prohibits a jury from determining the truth or veracity of religious beliefs 
or doctrines, but allowing the jury to determine whether respondent well knew their 
proffered religious beliefs were false). 
 43. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 714 (“[T]he resolution of that question is not to turn 
upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question; religious 
beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in 
order to merit First Amendment protection.”). 
 44. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
 45. Id. at 710. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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his religious precepts because he would not be contributing directly to 
the war.48  The Indiana Supreme Court found Thomas’s religious 
beliefs to be inconsistent and, therefore, found his objection to be a 
philosophical rather than a religious choice.49  The United States 
Supreme Court reversed, finding that Thomas had drawn a line 
between acceptable and unacceptable work based on his religious 
beliefs.  The Court concluded that it was not the judiciary’s role to 
question whether the line drawn was reasonable.50  Instead, “[t]he 
narrow function of a reviewing court in this context is to determine 
whether there was an appropriate finding that petitioner terminated 
his work because of an honest conviction that such work was forbidden 
by his religion.”51  Thus, if a person claims his conduct is connected to 
a religious belief, the reviewing court will most likely assent without 
further inquiry.52 
2. Permissible restriction on religious exercise 
Prior to the 1990s, the Supreme Court struggled to elucidate any 
clear boundaries of permissible government restrictions on religious 
conduct.53  In earlier cases, the Court declined to strike down laws that 
were generally applicable and neutral towards religion, notwithstanding 
any burden on religious exercise.54  In later cases, the Court 
determined whether a law substantially burdened religious exercise;55 
if it did, the Court applied some form of interest balancing test.56 
In early cases, the Court did not subject a challenged law to any form 
of scrutiny if it found that the law was generally applicable and 
religiously neutral.57  The Court was not concerned with the burden 
                                               
 48. Id. at 710–11. 
 49. Id. at 714–15. 
 50. Id. at 715. 
 51. Id. at 716. 
 52. See Levinson, supra note 37. 
 53. See William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma:  Free Exercise as Expression, 
67 MINN. L. REV. 545, 549–57 (1983) (discussing the Court’s inconsistent decisions in 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, United States v. Lee, Sherbert v. Verner, and Braunfeld v. Brown). 
 54. See infra text accompanying notes 57–58. 
 55. See infra notes 62–68 and accompanying text. 
 56. See infra notes 69–79 and accompanying text. 
 57. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166–68 (1944) (denying 
religious exemptions for portions of state’s child labor laws); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296, 305 (1940) (striking down a statute targeting religious solicitation but 
recognizing that if the statute simply targeted solicitation in general, there would be 
no constitutional claim); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 161–67 (1878) 
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on individual religious exercise.  Instead, it focused on the detriment 
that mandatory religious accommodations would impose on the 
government and society.58 
Over time, the Court shifted its concern from the broad detriment 
to society to the individual burden on religious exercise.59  If the Court 
found that a law substantially burdened religious exercise, it used strict 
scrutiny to balance the government’s interest against the individual’s 
interests.60  A law burdened religious exercise if it criminalized or 
penalized specific religious conduct.61  A law only indirectly or 
incidentally burdened religious exercise if it merely made religious 
observance more difficult or did not require the religious objector to 
engage in the violative conduct himself.62   
Thus, the government substantially burdened religious exercise 
when it denied unemployment benefits to an individual who quit his 
                                               
(denying religious accommodation from neutral, generally applicable statutes 
criminalizing polygamy). 
 58. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167 (“To permit this [exemption] would be to make the 
professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to 
permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.  Government could exist only in 
name under such circumstances.”). 
 59. Compare id. at 166–67 (denying religious accommodations because the 
accommodations could prevent the government from maintaining order), with 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972) (granting religious accommodation after 
finding that mandatory school attendance would “substantially interfer[e]” with Amish 
students’ religious development). 
 60. See infra notes 63–78 and accompanying text. 
 61. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981) 
(“Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed 
by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by 
religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his 
behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists.  While the compulsion 
may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial.”). 
 62. See, e.g., Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 447, 449 
(1988) (recognizing the government’s actions would have severe adverse effects on 
respondents’ religious practice but denying a religious exemption because the 
government neither coerced respondents into violating their religious beliefs through 
criminal sanctions nor “penalize[d] religious activity by denying . . . an equal share of 
the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens”); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 
693, 701 (1986) (holding that the government’s use of a social security number did 
not impair the claimant’s ability to believe, express, or exercise his religion); Braunfeld 
v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961) (“To strike down, without the most critical scrutiny, 
legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion, i.e., 
legislation which does not make unlawful the religious practice itself, would radically 
restrict the operating latitude of the legislature.”). 
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job because the job required that he violate his religious beliefs.63  The 
state penalized the individual for adhering to his religious beliefs, 
thereby placing upon him a substantial pressure to modify his 
behavior.64  However, a law that required owners to close their 
businesses on Sundays only indirectly burdened the religious exercise 
of an owner whose religious beliefs required that he also close his 
business on Saturdays.65  The law did not require the business owner 
to engage in any behavior that his religion forbid; it simply made 
religious observance more expensive.66  Additionally, conditioning the 
receipt of food stamps upon permitting the government to create a 
social security number only incidentally violated a Native American’s 
religious belief that a social security number would “rob” his 
daughter’s spirit.67  The government had not required that the Native 
American create the spirit robbing number himself; rather, it merely 
required that he allow the government to create the number.68 
When the Court found that the government substantially burdened 
religious exercise, it reviewed the government action under strict 
scrutiny.  The Court first applied strict scrutiny to laws burdening 
religious exercise in Sherbert v. Verner.69  There, the Court reviewed 
whether South Carolina violated the Free Exercise Clause by denying 
unemployment benefits because an applicant refused to accept work 
                                               
 63. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 717 (finding that the “employee was put to a choice 
between fidelity to religious belief or cessation of work”). 
 64. Id. at 717–18. 
 65. See Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 606 (noting that the Sunday closing law “may well 
result in some financial sacrifice in order to observe their religious beliefs,” but finding 
that this “is wholly different than when the legislation attempts to make a religious 
practice itself unlawful”). 
 66. Id. at 605. 
 67. See Roy, 476 U.S. at 696, 706 (holding that the government’s use of a social 
security number did not impair the claimant’s ability to believe, express, or exercise 
his religion). 
 68. See id. (“[A] government regulation that indirectly and incidentally calls for a 
choice between securing a governmental benefit and adherence to religious beliefs is 
wholly different from governmental action or legislation that criminalizes religiously 
inspired activity or inescapably compels conduct that some find objectionable for 
religious reasons.”).  In this case, the Court also focused on the fact that the Free 
Exercise Clause cannot be used to compel the government to conduct its own internal 
affairs in accordance with the claimant’s religious beliefs.  See id. at 709 (“Never to our 
knowledge has the Court interpreted the First Amendment to require the Government 
itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will further his or her spiritual 
development . . . .”). 
 69. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
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that required her to work on her Sabbath.70  The Court rejected the 
state’s argument that it had a compelling interest in preventing 
fraudulent claims of religious burden because the state had not raised 
this interest before the South Carolina Supreme Court; however, the 
Court noted that even if it were to accept this as a compelling state 
interest, the state would have to “demonstrate that no alternative forms 
of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First 
Amendment rights.”71  The Court’s decision in Sherbert announced the 
typical balancing test under strict scrutiny, which requires that the 
government demonstrate that it has a compelling interest and that it 
used the least restrictive means of achieving that interest. 
In some cases, the Court applied a narrow compelling interest 
analysis, under which it required the government to show that applying 
the law to the individual religious objector served the government’s 
compelling interest.  In Wisconsin v. Yoder,72 three parents, members of 
the Old Order Amish and the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church, 
challenged a Wisconsin law that mandated that children under the age 
of sixteen attend school.73  The parents believed that sending their 
children to high school was “contrary to the Amish way of life,” and 
doing so would “endanger their own salvation and that of their 
children.”74  The state argued that education was necessary to “preserve 
freedom and independence” by ensuring citizens become “effective and 
intelligent” participants in the political process and “self-reliant and self-
sufficient participants in society.”75  The Court refused to accept this 
general interest as sufficient justification for burdening the parents’ 
religious exercise.76  Instead, the Court examined the “impediment to 
those objectives that would flow from recognizing” an exception for the 
Amish.77  Because the government failed to demonstrate how an 
exception for the Amish would prevent it from pursuing its interest, the 
Court granted the parents a religious exemption.78  
In other cases, the Court used a broader compelling interest analysis, 
under which it permitted the government to justify a law by broadly 
                                               
 70. Id. at 400–01. 
 71. Id. at 407. 
 72. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 73. Id. at 207. 
 74. Id. at 208. 
 75. Id. at 221. 
 76. Id. at 236.  
 77. Id. at 221.  
 78. Id. at 236.  
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defining its compelling interests such that it required uniform 
application.79  For example, in United States v. Lee,80 the Court found 
that the government’s broad public interest in providing Social 
Security insurance required uniform application of the Social Security 
Tax.81  There, a member of the Older Order Amish challenged 
compulsory participation in the social security tax system.82  He 
claimed that giving or receiving public benefits through the social 
security system would violate his Amish beliefs.83  The Court did not 
question whether granting a religious exception in this case would 
impede the government’s interest.84  Instead, the Court focused on the 
effect of religious exemptions in the aggregate, and found that 
permitting a “myriad [of] exceptions flowing from a wide variety of 
religious beliefs” would inhibit the government’s ability to achieve its 
compelling interest.85  
In 1990, the Court simplified its analysis, creating a predictable and 
uniform approach based on early Free Exercise Clause precedent.  In 
Employment Division v. Smith, the Court held that the Free Exercise 
Clause does not require the government to provide religious 
accommodation from neutral, generally applicable laws.86  The 
majority expressed concern that subjecting neutral laws of general 
applicability to strict scrutiny would foster anarchy by creating 
                                               
 79. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258–60 (1982) (focusing on the 
broad public interest in providing Social Security insurance and the need for uniform 
application as compelling); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608 (1961) (rejecting 
appellants’ argument that an exemption for individuals whose religious convictions 
require a different day of rest would still permit the state to achieve its compelling 
interest in affording a uniform day of rest without burdening appellants’ religious 
exercise—“to permit the exemption might well undermine the State’s goal of 
providing a day that, as best possible, eliminates the atmosphere of commercial noise 
and activity.”). 
 80. 455 U.S. 252 (1982). 
 81. Id. at 258–60. 
 82. Id. at 254–55. 
 83. Id. at 259.  
 84. The Court inquired into whether permitting exemptions for the “Amish 
belief” would interfere with the government’s ability to achieve its interest.  Id. at 259.  
Yet, the Court’s analysis focused on the harms that numerous religious exemptions 
would pose to the tax system in general.  See id. at 260 (denying a religious exemption 
for the social security tax and reasoning that, because income taxes cannot be 
separated into discrete obligations, allowing partial exemptions would frustrate the 
general tax system as a whole). 
 85. Id. at 260. 
 86. 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (denying religious exemption from Oregon’s 
controlled substance law for the ceremonial ingestion of peyote). 
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“constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations 
of every conceivable kind.”87  This concern was premised on the 
understanding that strict scrutiny must have the same meaning and 
application as in other areas of constitutional law, and under this 
uniform approach, many laws would fail.88  The majority distinguished 
Smith from prior cases in which the Court applied the compelling 
interest test to laws burdening a person’s religious exercise.89  Those 
cases fell into two categories:  (1) hybrid cases involving religious 
exercise and another constitutionally protected right;90 and 
(2) unemployment compensation cases in which the relevant statutes 
created individual exemptions for individuals who quit or refused 
available work for “good cause.”91 
Thus, under the Free Exercise Clause, a law burdening religious 
exercise will be subject to strict scrutiny only if it is not a neutral law of 
general applicability.92  A law is not neutral if “the object . . . is to 
infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious 
motivation.”93  A law is not generally applicable if it only prohibits 
conduct when it is motivated by religious beliefs.94  Thus, most Free 
Exercise claims will fail under Smith unless the government has 
specifically targeted religion.95 
                                               
 87. Id. at 888–89. 
 88. See id. at 885–86, 888 (noting that, while applying strict scrutiny in the context of 
laws based on race or laws regulating speech results in “equal[] treatment and the 
unrestricted flow of speech,” applying strict scrutiny to all laws in the context of religious 
exercise “would produce . . . a private right to ignore generally applicable laws”). 
 89. See id. at 881–84. 
 90. See id. at 881–82. 
 91. Id. at 883–84 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986) (Burger, C.J.)). 
 92. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc., v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 527–
28, 542, 545–46 (1993) (applying strict scrutiny to a city ordinance that prohibited the ritual 
sacrifice of animals because it was neither a neutral law nor a law of general applicability). 
 93. Id. at 533. 
 94. The Court declined to precisely define a standard for determining whether a law 
is one of general applicability; however, its decision shed light on what might qualify.  See 
id. at 542–43 (“The Free Exercise Clause ‘protects religious observers against unequal 
treatment,’ . . . and inequality results when a legislature decides that the governmental 
interests it seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct with a 
religious motivation.” (citations omitted)).  Further, this synthesis comports with the 
interpretations of lower courts.  See, e.g., Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 15, 18 
(1st Cir. 2004) (accepting the district court’s construction of general applicability as 
prohibiting the government from selectively burdening religious conduct). 
 95. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2019 
(2017) (recognizing that under the Free Exercise Clause, laws that “target the religious 
for ‘special disabilities’ based on their ‘religious status’” are subject to strict scrutiny 
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B.   The RFRA Reaction 
This Section discusses Congress’s response to the Court’s decision 
in Smith and the expansion of statutory protections for religious 
exercise.  Section I.B.1 discusses RFRA, enacted to restore protection 
of religious freedom to pre-Smith standards.  Section I.B.2 discusses 
how the Supreme Court has construed and applied RFRA. 
1. Accommodating religion beyond the Free Exercise Clause 
In 1993, Congress enacted RFRA to overturn the Court’s decision in 
Smith.96  RFRA states: 
Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion 
only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the 
person— 
(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.97 
A person may use RFRA to file a claim against the government, or he 
may use RFRA to defend his otherwise unlawful actions.98 
Through enacting RFRA, Congress set out to restore the pre-Smith 
Free Exercise compelling interest test99 developed in Sherbert100 and 
Yoder.101  Congress found that pre-Smith cases provided “a workable test 
for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing 
prior governmental interests.”102  To determine whether the government 
met the compelling interest requirement, Congress expected courts to 
look to the pre-Smith Free Exercise precedent in applying this test.103  
Further, Congress cautioned courts against construing RFRA as applying 
                                               
(quoting Lukumi Babalu, 508 U.S. at 533)); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., If Judges were Angels:  
Religious Equality, Free Exercise, and the (Underappreciated) Merits of Smith, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 
1189, 1194 (2008) (intimating that the inconsistent application of strict scrutiny is 
preferable to lowering the standard of review to rational basis because, unlike strict 
scrutiny, applying rational basis “virtually ensures that most free exercise claims will fail”). 
 96. Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–
2000bb-4 (2012)). 
 97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1(b)(1)–(2). 
 98. See § 2000bb-1(c) (providing avenues for judicial relief). 
 99. § 2000bb(b)(1). 
 100. 374 U.S. 398 (1963); see also supra notes 69–71 and accompanying text for a 
brief explanation of Sherbert v. Verner. 
 101. 406 U.S. 205 (1972); see also supra note 79 and accompanying text for a brief 
explanation of Wisconsin v. Yoder. 
 102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(5); S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 3 (1993). 
 103. S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 8–9; H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 7 (1993). 
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a compelling interest test that is more or less stringent than it was prior to 
Smith.104  Thus, Congress did not intend for courts to rely solely on Sherbert 
and Yoder; rather, it intended for courts to utilize the compelling interest 
test as it evolved up to the time of the Smith decision.105  
Under RFRA, this compelling interest test only applies where the 
federal government has substantially burdened a person’s religious 
exercise.  RFRA does not require the government to meet strict 
scrutiny for every government action that has some incidental burden 
on religious exercise.106  Therefore, the threshold question in any case 
is:  Did the government substantially burden the claimant’s religious 
exercise?  If not, then RFRA cannot be used to provide a religious 
accommodation.  Again, Congress expected courts to look to pre-Smith 
precedent to determine whether a law or government action 
substantially burdens a person’s religious exercise.107 
2. The Supreme Court’s current construction 
In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal,108 the Court 
held that under RFRA, the government must demonstrate that 
applying “the challenged law [to] . . . the particular claimant” serves 
the government’s compelling interest.109  Courts must “look[] beyond 
                                               
 104. S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 9 (describing the bill not as a codification of any 
decisions reached before Smith, but rather restoring the legal standard applied in those 
cases); H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 7 (instructing courts not to apply a test that is any more 
or less stringent than was used prior to Smith). 
 105. In the text of RFRA, Congress declared its intent to restore the compelling 
interest test used in Sherbert and Yoder.  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1).  In committee 
reports, Congress cited subsequent cases to support the finding that the compelling 
interest test is workable and strikes a sensible balance between religious liberty and 
competing governmental interests.  See S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 5 n.5 (citing Hernandez 
v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); 
United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)).  These cases demonstrate Congress’s 
approval of both the broad and narrow compelling interest tests discussed in Section 
I.A.2.  See Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 684 (upholding the government’s action in denying 
members of the Church of Scientology a tax deduction for payments they made to 
branch churches for “auditing” and “training” services); Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 605 
(upholding the government’s denial of a tax exemption to a religious college that 
claimed its religious beliefs mandated racially discriminatory practices); Lee, 455 U.S. 
at 261 (upholding the government’s action in requiring an Amish employer to pay a 
portion of Social Security taxes). 
 106. S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 9 & n.18 (using fire codes, which apply equally to secular 
and religious buildings, as an example of neutral and compelling laws and regulations). 
 107. Id. at 8; H.R. REP. NO. 103-88, at 6. 
 108. 546 U.S. 418 (2006). 
 109. Id. at 430–31. 
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broadly formulated interests justifying the general applicability of 
government mandates and scrutinize[] the asserted harm of granting 
specific exemptions to particular religious claimants.”110  In other 
words, the government must demonstrate that it has a compelling 
interest beyond the mere interest in a uniform application of the law, 
and that providing a religious exemption to the particular claimant 
would undermine the achievement of that compelling interest.111 
In Hobby Lobby, the Court held that closely held, for-profit 
corporations can exercise religion and that, under RFRA, their 
religious exercise is protected.112  In that case, several closely held, for-
profit corporations challenged a government regulation promulgated 
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act113 that required 
certain employers to provide their employees with insurance plans 
covering multiple forms of birth control.114  The corporations’ majority 
shareholders believed that several of these forms of birth control were 
abortifacients,115 and argued that the regulation burdened their 
religious exercise by forcing them to “facilitate access to contraceptive 
drugs or devices that operate after” conception.116  Applying RFRA, the 
Court found that the contraceptive mandate substantially burdened 
the corporations’ religious exercise.117  The government argued that 
the contraceptive mandate did not substantially burden the 
petitioners’ religious exercise because providing the coverage would 
not itself result in the “sinful” destruction of an embryo.118  An embryo 
                                               
 110. Id. at 431. 
 111. See id. at 435–36 (distinguishing the present case from others in which the 
government demonstrated that permitting exemptions would “seriously compromise 
its ability to administer the program”). 
 112. See 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2772 (2014) (“When first enacted, RFRA defined the ‘exercise 
of religion’ to mean ‘the exercise of religion under the First Amendment’—not the 
exercise of religion as recognized only by then-existing Supreme Court precedents.”). 
 113. Pub L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
 114. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2775. 
 115. An abortifacient is “an agent (such as a drug) that induces abortion.”  
Abortifacient, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/abort 
ifacient (last visited Dec. 3, 2018). 
 116. See Hobby Lobby, 137 S. Ct. at 2762–66. 
 117. See id. at 2779 (concluding that the economic penalties imposed by the 
regulation of employers who fail to comply with the contraceptive mandate because of 
their religious beliefs created a substantial burden on the corporations). 
 118. See id. at 2777 (summarizing the government’s argument that the connection 
between the contraceptive mandate and petitioners’ moral objection to the destruction 
of an embryo was “simply too attenuated” to violate the Free Exercise Clause). 
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would be destroyed “only if an employee chose to take advantage of 
the coverage” and then made an additional choice to use one of the 
four methods at issue.119  According to the majority, this reasoning 
confused the permissible question of whether religious exercise is 
substantially burdened with the impermissible question of whether the 
religious belief is reasonable.120  Instead, it held that the narrow 
function of the Court in determining whether religious exercise is 
substantially burdened is to determine whether the line drawn 
between the belief and objectionable act is “an honest conviction.”121  
Further, because the government already provided accommodations 
to churches and religious nonprofits, the government demonstrated 
that it had a readily available least restrictive alternative.122  Thus, the 
closely held, for-profit corporations were exempt from the 
contraceptive mandate because the government was unable to satisfy 
the requirements of RFRA.123 
In an attempt to quell the dissent’s fears that its decision will permit 
every corporation to become a law unto itself, the majority rejected the 
possibility “that discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of 
race, might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal sanction.”124  
It reasoned that the government has a compelling interest in providing 
equal opportunity in the workforce, and Title VII’s prohibition on racial 
discrimination is the least restrictive means to achieve that goal.125 
Justice Ginsburg dissented on multiple grounds.  First, she rejected 
the majority’s holding that corporations can exercise religion.126  When 
an individual incorporates a business, he separates himself from the 
entity to escape personal liability and, therefore, should not be able to 
attach his religious beliefs to the corporation’s conduct.127  Second, 
                                               
 119. Id.  The four methods of birth control at issue were FDA-approved contraceptive 
options that may operate after the fertilization of an egg.  See id. at 2762–63. 
 120. Id. at 2778; see also supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
 121. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2779 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t 
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1982)). 
 122. Id. at 2782. 
 123. See id. at 2785. 
 124. Id. at 2783. 
 125. Id. 
 126. See id. at 2793–94 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that RFRA “applies to 
government actions that ‘substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion,’” and 
asserting that there is “no support for the notion that free exercise rights pertain to 
for-profit corporations”). 
 127. See id. at 2797 (questioning “why the separation should hold only when it serves 
the interest of those who control the corporation”). 
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Justice Ginsburg found that the majority misconstrued the substantial 
burden analysis.128  The majority’s honest conviction test substituted a 
factual finding that the petitioners’ beliefs are sincere and religious for 
a legal conclusion that the religious belief is substantially burdened.129  
Further, under the proper construction, the government had not 
substantially burdened the petitioners’ religious exercise.130  Justice 
Ginsburg found that any burden the claimants felt was “too attenuated” 
because the government had not required them to “purchase or 
provide” the objectionable contraceptives, but only to disperse “money 
into undifferentiated funds that finance a wide variety of benefits.”131  
Therefore, in Justice Ginsburg’s view, the majority opinion was a bold 
departure from pre-Smith jurisprudence because it eliminated RFRA’s 
substantial burden prong and expanded the scope of entities protected.132 
C.   The Inclusive Interpretation of Title VII 
As the Supreme Court was expanding protection for religious 
exercise under RFRA, it was simultaneously expanding constitutional 
protections for LGBT citizens.133  In just twelve short years, LGBT 
                                               
 128. See id. at 2799. 
 129. See id. at 2798.  (acknowledging that the petitioners’ beliefs were sincerely held 
but finding them insufficient for a RFRA claim). 
 130. See id. at 2799. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 2791–92. 
 133. The Supreme Court’s decisions focus on lesbian, gay, and bisexual citizens.  
See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604–08 (2015) (recognizing that the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment protect the 
right to marry for same sex partners); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) 
(striking down a state law that criminalized homosexual sodomy but not heterosexual 
sodomy under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).  However, 
several lower court decisions have held that the Equal Protect Clause requires courts 
to apply intermediate scrutiny to government actions that discriminate against 
transgender citizens.  See, e.g., Whitaker ex rel. Whitaker v. Kenosha Unified Sch. Dist. 
No. 1 Bd. of Educ., 858 F.3d 1034, 1048, 1051 (7th Cir. 2017) (finding that 
discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity is gender discrimination under 
the Equal Protection Clause); Glenn v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(holding that discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity is sex-based 
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 
566, 568, 576–77 (6th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the appellant alleged sufficient facts 
to demonstrate discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity to bring a claim 
of sex discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause).  But see Etsitty v. Utah 
Transit Auth., 502 F.3d 1215, 1221, 1227–28 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
transgender is not a suspect class under Title VII and, therefore, the appellant failed 
to allege a sufficient claim under the Equal Protection Clause). 
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citizens went from lacking the fundamental right to engage in intimate 
same-sex relationships to the right to marry same-sex partners.134  
During this brisk shift in the legal and sociopolitical climate, the EEOC 
and several circuit courts adopted an inclusive interpretation of Title 
VII’s proscription of sex discrimination.135 
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to discharge or otherwise 
discriminate against an employee “because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”136  In Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins,137 the Court held that Title VII’s prohibition on sex 
discrimination prohibits an employer from taking gender into account, 
and therefore precludes discrimination against an employee for failure 
to conform to sex-stereotypes.138  In other words, Title VII prohibits an 
employer from making adverse employment decisions based on the 
fact that a female employee fails to act or appear in a stereotypically 
feminine way.139  Similarly, it prohibits firing a male employee for 
failing to present or act in a stereotypically masculine way.140  Thus, in 
Price Waterhouse, an employer violated Title VII when it denied 
partnership to a female employee because she failed to behave as some 
of the partners believed a woman should.141 
In 2012, the EEOC held that discrimination on the basis of 
nonconforming gender expression is actionable as sex discrimination 
                                               
 134. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604–05 (protecting same-sex marriage); Lawrence, 
539 U.S. at 578–79 (protecting same-sex intimate relations). 
 135. See infra notes 137–144 and accompanying text. 
 136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
 137. 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a), as recognized in Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 213 n.4 (2014). 
 138. See id. at 239, 251 (“[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate 
employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with 
their group . . . .”). 
 139. See id. at 250 (noting that “an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a 
woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis of gender”). 
 140. Though Price Waterhouse concerned a female employee, id. at 231–32, the only 
logical inference is that Title VII must also prohibit discrimination against males on 
the same basis.  Some lower courts have expressly stated this.  See Smith v. City of Salem, 
378 F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 
864 (9th Cir. 2001); Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 261 n.4 
(1st Cir. 1999); Rosa v. Park W. Bank & Tr. Co., 214 F.3d 213, 214 (1st Cir. 2000)). 
 141. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234–35 (discussing partner reviews 
recommending the company deny partnership because the female employee was too 
masculine, and the given advice that the employee walk, talk, and dress more 
femininely to improve her chances in the future). 
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under Title VII.142  The EEOC acknowledged that discrimination 
against a transgender employee might be based on sex stereotypes—
the employer’s belief “that biological men should consistently present 
as men and wear male clothing”—but it recognized that this is just one 
way to prove sex discrimination.143  The EEOC took guidance from the 
Supreme Court’s finding in Price Waterhouse that Congress intended to 
forbid employers from taking gender into account at all: 
When an employer discriminates against someone because the 
person is transgender, the employer has engaged in disparate 
treatment “related to the sex of the victim.” . . . This is true regardless 
of whether an employer discriminates against an employee because 
the individual has expressed his or her gender in a non-stereotypical 
fashion, because the employer is uncomfortable with the fact that 
the person has transitioned or is in the process of transitioning from 
one gender to another, or because the employer simply does not like 
that the person is identifying as a transgender person.  In each of 
these circumstances, the employer is making a gender-based 
evaluation . . . .144 
Thus, while the EEOC recognizes that discrimination against 
gender-nonconforming employees falls under “sex-stereotyping,” its 
decision is much broader than that of the Supreme Court’s in Price 
Waterhouse.  The EEOC is not alone; the Sixth Circuit recently 
abandoned the requirement that a transgender employee demonstrate 
sex-stereotyping to prevail on a Title VII claim.145  Instead, the court 
relied on Justice Brennan’s finding that Title VII requires “gender [to] 
be irrelevant to employment decisions,” and an employer does not treat 
gender as irrelevant if an employee’s attempt or desire to change his or 
her sex leads to an adverse employment decision.146 
Additionally, the EEOC has broadened the sex-stereotyping 
framework in holding that discrimination on the basis of sexual 
                                               
 142. See Macy v. Holder, Appeal No. 0120120821, 2012 WL 1435995, at *7 (E.E.O.C. 
Apr. 20, 2012). 
 143. Id. at *10 (considering an employer’s willingness to hire an individual it 
believed to be a man but unwillingness to hire the individual after learning she was 
now a woman to be sex discrimination as well). 
 144. Id. at *7 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 228, 244). 
 145. See EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 571 (6th 
Cir. 2018) (“Discrimination on the basis of transgender and transitioning status is 
necessarily discrimination on the basis of sex . . . .”), petition for cert. docketed, No. 18-107 
(U.S. July 24, 2018). 
 146. Id. at 576 (alteration in original) (quoting Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240). 
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orientation is discrimination based on sex.147  In Baldwin v. Foxx,148 the 
EEOC found that sexual orientation cannot be defined without 
reference to sex—it is “inseparable from and inescapably linked to 
sex.”149  When an employer discriminates based on sexual orientation, 
he necessarily treats the employee less favorably because of his sex.150  
For example, if “an employer suspends a lesbian employee for 
displaying a photo of her female spouse on her desk, but does not 
suspend a male employee for displaying a photo of his female spouse 
on his desk,” the employer took an adverse action against the lesbian 
employee that he would not have taken had the employee been 
male.151  Thus, as construed, Title VII protects against discrimination 
related to a person’s gender expression and sexual orientation.152 
                                               
 147. See Baldwin v. Foxx, Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641, at *5 (E.E.O.C. 
July 15, 2015) (“[W]e conclude that sexual orientation is inherently a ‘sex-based 
consideration,’ and an allegation of discrimination based on sexual orientation is 
necessarily an allegation of sex discrimination under Title VII.”). 
 148. Appeal No. 0120133080, 2015 WL 4397641 (E.E.O.C. July 15, 2015). 
 149. Id. at *5. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Several circuit courts have also held that Title VII prohibits discrimination 
because of a person’s gender expression and sexual orientation.  See, e.g., Zarda v. 
Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 112 (2d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (concluding that 
“sexual orientation discrimination is motivated, at least in part, by sex and is thus a 
subset of sex discrimination”), petition for cert. docketed, No. 17-1623 (U.S. June 1, 2018); 
Hively v. Ivy Tech Cmty Coll., 853 F.3d 339, 345 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc) (asserting 
that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is “paradigmatic” sex 
discrimination); Chavez v. Credit Nation Auto Sales, LLC, 641 F. App’x 883, 883 (11th 
Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (citing Glen v. Brumby, 663 F.3d 1312, 1316–17 (11th Cir. 
2011)) (reiterating that discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity is gender 
discrimination under Title VII); Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 
2004) (finding that “Title VII’s reference to ‘sex’ encompasses both the biological 
differences between men and women, and gender discrimination, that is, 
discrimination based on a failure to conform to stereotypical gender norms” (citing 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)).  However, not all circuit 
courts interpret discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as part of sex 
discrimination.  See Evans v. Ga. Reg’l Hosp., 850 F.3d 1248, 1254–55 (11th Cir. 2017) 
(holding discrimination on the basis of gender nonconformity, but not sexual 
orientation itself, is actionable under Title VII), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2017) 
(mem.); Bibby v. Phila. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 260 F.3d 257, 261 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(stating that discrimination based on sexual orientation is not prohibited by Title VII), 
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1155 (2002) (mem.); Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36 (2d 
Cir. 2000), overruled by Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 2018) 
(holding sex discrimination does not include discrimination because of sexual 
orientation).  Further, the issue is currently pending before the Eighth Circuit.  See 
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D.   The Inevitable Clash Between Opposing Rights 
It was only a matter of time before religious rights and civil rights 
clashed.153  In Harris Funeral Homes, the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Michigan held that, under RFRA, a closely held, 
for-profit corporation was exempt from Title VII’s prohibition on sex 
discrimination.154  Thomas Rost, the owner and majority shareholder 
of R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., fired the funeral home 
director, Aimee Stephens, shortly after she informed him that she 
would begin transitioning from male to female.155  The funeral home 
had no affiliation to any religious organization.156  However, Rost had 
been a Christian for over sixty-five years, and he believed that the 
“Bible teaches that a person’s sex (whether male or female) is an 
immutable God-given gift and that it is wrong for a person to deny his 
or her God-given sex.”157  Further, Rost believed that he would violate 
“God’s commands” by permitting a male funeral director to wear a 
skirt suit because he “would be directly involved in supporting the idea 
that sex is a changeable social construct rather than an immutable 
God-given gift.”158  Rost did not deny firing Stephens because of her 
transition.159  Instead, he claimed that retaining Stephens as an 
employee would violate his, and by proxy the funeral home’s, sincerely 
held religious beliefs.  Thus, under RFRA, Rost argued that the 
government should exempt him from Title VII.160 
                                               
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant Mark Horton, Horton v. Midwest Geriatric Mgmt., LLC, 
No. 18-1104 (8th Cir. Aug. 30, 2018), 2018 WL 1350998. 
 153. Chief Justice Roberts predicted this clash in Obergefell v. Hodges: 
Hard questions arise when people of faith exercise religion in ways that may 
be seen to conflict with the new right to same-sex marriage—when, for 
example, a religious college provides married student housing only to 
opposite-sex married couples, or a religious adoption agency declines to place 
children with same-sex married couples.  Indeed, the Solicitor General 
candidly acknowledged that the tax exemptions of some religious institutions 
would be in question if they opposed same-sex marriage . . . .  There is little 
doubt that these and similar questions will soon be before this Court. 
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2625–26 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
 154. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 842 
(E.D. Mich. 2016), rev’d, 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. docketed, No. 18-
107 (U.S. July 24, 2018). 
 155. Id. at 843–45. 
 156. Id. at 843. 
 157. Id. at 847–48 (citation omitted). 
 158. Id. at 848 (citation omitted). 
 159. Id. at 846–47. 
 160. Id. at 848, 851. 
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The district court agreed with Rost.161  First, it found that the EEOC 
substantially burdened Rost’s religious exercise.162  The court rejected 
the EEOC’s argument that it would only substantially burden the 
funeral home’s religious exercise if it required the home to provide 
female clothes to Stephens.163  Adhering to the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Hobby Lobby, the court acknowledged that its function was 
not to decide whether the funeral home’s “religious beliefs are 
mistaken or insubstantial.”164  Rather, the court could only determine 
whether the belief was “an honest conviction.”165  Thus, because the 
court found Rost (and by proxy the funeral home) honestly believed 
he would violate his religious beliefs by permitting another person to 
express their gender identity, RFRA required the court to apply the 
compelling interest test.166 
The court assumed that the EEOC had a compelling interest in 
applying Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination to the funeral 
home.167  The court did not read the Hobby Lobby dicta on Title VII—
declaring that Title VII serves a compelling interest and is narrowly 
tailored—as exempting Title VII from the focused analysis RFRA 
demands.168  Though the court expressed doubts that the EEOC had met 
this burden, the Supreme Court’s Hobby Lobby decision did not offer 
                                               
 161. See id. at 863. 
 162. See id. at 856–57 (concluding that it was a substantial burden to require Rost to 
employ a biological male who wore clothing that complied with the Funeral Home’s 
female dress code). 
 163. See id. at 855. 
 164. Id. at 856 (quoting Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2779 (2014)). 
 165. Id. (quoting Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2279)). 
 166. As an ad hoc justification of its substantial burden analysis, the court noted 
that the funeral home would be forced to pay back and front pay to Stephens for firing 
her.  Id. (noting the economic and mental pressure that would befall Rost were the 
court to apply Title VII after already finding his religious exercise to be substantially 
burdened).  Further, the court noted that Rost testified that if he were required to 
maintain Stephens as an employee, he would feel pressure to sell his business.  Id.  Yet, 
the court based its substantial burden analysis on the mere fact that “requiring the 
Funeral Home to provide a skirt to and/or allow an employee born a biological male 
to wear a skirt at work would impose a substantial burden on the ability of Rost to 
conduct his business in accordance with his sincerely-held religious beliefs.”  Id. 
 167. See id. at 859 (referencing the EEOC’s motion for summary judgment, which 
broadly described the compelling interest as “protecting employees from gender 
stereotyping in the workplace”). 
 168. See id. at 856–58 (discussing the more focused inquiry set forth in O Centro and 
reaffirmed in Hobby Lobby). 
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guidance on how to apply the compelling interest analysis to Title VII.169  
Therefore, the court assumed that the EEOC had a compelling interest.170 
Next, the court found that the EEOC failed to utilize the least 
restrictive method of ensuring that Rost complied with Title VII’s 
proscription of sex discrimination.171  The court rejected the EEOC’s 
argument that Title VII’s prohibition on sex discrimination was 
precisely tailored to ensure employees would not lose their jobs due to 
an employer’s gender stereotyping.172  Instead, the court required that 
the EEOC show that the burden on the funeral home’s religious 
exercise was the least restrictive means of eliminating clothing gender 
stereotypes at the funeral home.173  The court found that requiring 
Rost to implement a gender-neutral dress code would have burdened 
his religious exercise less than requiring him to permit Stephens to 
wear a skirt.174  Therefore, RFRA required the court to grant Rost a 
religious exemption from Title VII.175 
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 
reversed.176  First, the Sixth Circuit held that requiring Rost to comply 
with Title VII did not substantially burden his religious exercise.177  The 
court recognized that it was Rost’s sincerely held belief that the 
                                               
 169. Id. at 859. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See id. at 862–63. 
 172. See id. at 860 (noting that this “conclusory” argument is too broad and does not 
focus on the specific burdens on the funeral home). 
 173. Id. at 859–60. 
 174. Id. at 862.  While there are valid arguments for abstaining from determining 
whether the line between the religious belief and objectionable act are reasonable, this 
case demonstrates how in some circumstances this leads the court to accept absurd 
and arbitrary lines.  Rost claimed that permitting Stephens to wear a skirt violated his 
sincerely held religious beliefs, and that he would be opposed to allowing a biological 
female employee to wear clothing complying with the funeral home’s male dress code; 
however, the court noted that Rost already permitted biological female employees to 
wear pantsuits without a neck tie.  Id. at 863 n.19.  While gender norms may certainly 
be seen in the Christian Bible, gender expression is a social construct that developed 
separate from religion.  Thus, it will change as society’s view of acceptable gender 
expression changes.  Wearing pants is now acceptable for women, yet one hundred years 
ago, only men were permitted to wear pants.  Granting a religious exemption based on 
objection to gender expression authorizes an employer to draw lines less related to 
religious beliefs and more properly understood as related to sociopolitical views. 
 175. Id. at 863. 
 176. See EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 590 (6th 
Cir. 2018), petition for cert. docketed, No. 18-107 (U.S. July 24, 2018). 
 177. See id. at 586 (concluding that Rost could not use potential customer biases to 
assert a substantial burden). 
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operation of the funeral home was a religious exercise, and that Rost 
honestly believed complying with Title VII would substantially burden 
his religious exercise.178  However, the court rejected the notion that it 
was powerless to determine whether Title VII substantially burdened 
that religious exercise.179  The court reasoned that ending the 
substantial burden inquiry after finding an honest conviction would only 
substitute the religious objector’s religious belief for legal analysis.180 
Second, the Sixth Circuit held that even if requiring Rost to comply 
with Title VII substantially burdened his religious exercise, the 
government met its burden under strict scrutiny.181  The court found 
that the EEOC has a compelling interest in eradicating sex 
discrimination, and exempting Rost would undermine that interest by 
permitting sex discrimination.182  Further, unlike the district court, the 
Sixth Circuit understood the Title VII dicta in Hobby Lobby to mean that 
Title VII is always narrowly tailored.183  Thus, the court held that Rost 
was not exempt from Title VII.184 
E.   Traversing the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses 
The Free Exercise Clause does not stand-alone; it is intrinsically 
bound to the Establishment Clause.185  Both clauses operate to secure 
religious freedom, but, much like the definition of religion, the 
boundaries of the Establishment Clause are elusive.186  At its most 
                                               
 178. See id. at 589. 
 179. Id. (“We reject a framework that takes away from courts the responsibility to 
decide what action the government requires and leaves that answer entirely to the 
religious adherent. Such a framework improperly substitutes religious belief for legal 
analysis regarding the operation of federal law.” (quoting Eternal Word Television 
Network, Inc., v. Sec’y of the U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 818 F.3d 1122, 
1145 (11th Cir. 2016))). 
 180. See id. 
 181. Id. at 590. 
 182. See id. at 590, 592–93. 
 183. Id. at 595. 
 184. See id. at 600 (granting summary judgment for the EEOC). 
 185. The text of the First Amendment mentions religion only once, yet both the 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clause refer to it.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I 
(“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof . . . .”); see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) 
(“The principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of religion does 
not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the Establishment Clause.”). 
 186. See Steven G. Gey, Vestiges of the Establishment Clause, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 4 
(2006) (commenting that the Supreme Court appears unable to provide sufficient 
guidance for understanding and applying the Establishment Clause). 
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restrictive posture, the Establishment Clause prevents the government 
from advancing or benefiting religion in anyway.187  At its most 
permissive posture, the Establishment Clause permits the government 
to aid or even favor religion, so long as the government does not 
officially establish a national church.188 
The Supreme Court’s incoherent jurisprudence stems from 
fundamental differences, in the minds of the Justices, of the degree of 
separation the Constitution imputes onto the church-state 
relationship.189  The varying degrees of constitutionally-required 
separation between the government and religion are best represented 
by three theories:  (1) strict separation, (2) accommodation, and 
(3) flexible accommodation.190  The theory of strict separation—best 
represented by Thomas Jefferson’s metaphor of a “wall of separation 
between church and state”—is premised on the understanding that the 
Establishment Clause requires the government to remain completely 
impartial to religion, providing neither accommodations nor 
burdens.191  The accommodation theory on the other hand, is premised 
on the understanding that religion does not exist in complete isolation 
from the government; the government must provide some aid to 
religion just as it must provide aid to other establishments (e.g., 
providing building permits, police, fire engines, etc.).192  Under this 
theory, the government may accommodate religion without necessarily 
establishing one.193  The flexible accommodation theory contends that 
the Establishment Clause simply prohibits the federal government from 
establishing a national church, nothing more.194 
                                               
 187. See infra notes 189–194 and accompanying text. 
 188. See infra notes 189–194 and accompanying text. 
 189. See Gey, supra note 186, at 12–36 (discussing the shift in Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence from strict separation to integration). 
 190. See Shahin Rezai, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU:  Evolution of Chaos in 
Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 503, 507–25 (1990) (discussing differences 
between the theories of strict separation, accommodation, and flexible accommodation). 
 191. Id. at 507–09; see also Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 609–10 (1992) (Souter, J., 
concurring) (noting that the Establishment Clause forbids laws that aid religion in general). 
 192. See Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 675–76 (1970) (explaining that the 
Establishment Clause cannot mean the “absence of all contact” between church and 
state because “the complexities of modern life inevitably produce some conduct and 
the fire and police protection received by houses of religious worship are no more 
than incidental benefits accorded all persons or institutions”). 
 193. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (confirming that the First 
Amendment cannot require complete separation but rather requires accommodation 
for, and forbids hostility towards, any religion). 
 194. Rezai, supra note 190, at 521. 
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As the Justices have adopted varying views on separation and integration, 
the Court has become increasingly divided in determining whether a given 
government action violates the Establishment Clause.195  The Court’s 
fractured precedent incorporates several common analyses, each premised 
on—to varying degrees—the three theories outlined above.  For purposes 
of this Comment, only three of these analyses are relevant.196   
First, under the Lemon test, developed in Lemon v. Kurtzman,197 a 
statute “must have a secular legislative purpose”; it must not have a 
“principal or primary effect” of advancing or inhibiting religion; and it 
“must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”198 
Second, under the endorsement test, the government must not have 
the primary purpose or effect of endorsing religion over non-
religion.199  The endorsement test is a mutation of the Lemon test that 
shifts the focus from whether the government’s primary purpose or 
effect is to advance or inhibit religion to whether the government’s 
action has the appearance of symbolically endorsing religion over non-
religion.200  According to Justice O’Connor, courts should look 
through the eyes of a hypothetical “reasonable observer,” who is 
familiar with the “history, language, and administration of a particular 
statute” to determine whether the government acted with the primary 
purpose of endorsing a religion.201  A statute has the effect of endorsing 
                                               
 195. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (six Justices filing separate opinions). 
 196. This Comment briefly discusses the Lemon test and the endorsement test to 
provide the reader with some general context but focuses mostly on the coercion test 
because it serves as the minimum threshold for determining whether government 
action violates the Establishment Clause.  See infra notes 203–216. 
 197. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 198. Id. at 612–13. 
 199. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687–88 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The 
Establishment Clause prohibits government from making adherence to a religion relevant 
in any way to a person’s standing in the political community . . . .  Endorsement sends a 
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored 
members of the political community.  Disapproval sends the opposite message.”). 
 200. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592 
(1989) (“Our subsequent decisions further have refined the definition of 
governmental action that unconstitutionally advances religion . . . .  [W]e have paid 
particularly close attention to whether the challenged governmental practice either 
has the purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ religion . . . .”), abrogated by Town of Greece v. 
Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014). 
 201. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 74 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also 
Capital Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 777 (1995) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“[W]hen the reasonable observer would view a government practice as 
endorsing religion, I believe that it is our duty to hold the practice invalid.”). 
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religion if it, intentionally or unintentionally, communicates a message 
of endorsement or disapproval of religion.202 
Finally, under the coercion test, the “government may not coerce 
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.”203  This test 
is best understood as establishing the minimum level of protection that 
the Establishment Clause provides; if the government coerces a person 
to conform to the beliefs of another, this will satisfy the primary effects 
prong of both the Lemon and endorsement test.204  In Lee v. Weisman,205 
the Supreme Court held that a public school could not incorporate 
clergy-delivered prayer at a graduation ceremony because the prayer 
indirectly coerced attendees to participate in a religious exercise.206  
The majority decided this case without referring to the Lemon test because, 
“at a minimum, the Constitution guarantees that government may not 
coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise.”207 
First, the Court found that the religious exercise “bore the imprint 
of the state” because the school’s principal decided to include the 
prayer, chose a rabbi to deliver the prayer, and advised the rabbi to 
provide a nonsectarian prayer.208  Second, the state’s involvement 
placed public pressure on the attendees to at least appear to 
                                               
 202. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that 
government practices that offer such an endorsement or disapproval make religion 
relevant to community status). 
 203. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (striking down school-sponsored 
prayer without relying on the Lemon test). 
 204. See id. at 604 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (“Although our precedents make 
clear that proof of government coercion is not necessary to prove an Establishment 
Clause violation, it is sufficient. Government pressure to participate in a religious 
activity is an obvious indication that the government is endorsing or promoting 
religion.”); see also id. at 618–21 (Souter, J., concurring) (rejecting the argument that 
the Establishment Clause only prohibits the government from coercing citizens to 
engage in religious activities because the Free Exercise Clause prohibits the 
government from coercing citizens to support or engage in religious activities and, 
therefore, reading the Establishment Clause as only prohibiting coercion essentially 
renders the Clause superfluous); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (“The 
Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon any 
showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of laws 
which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce 
nonobserving individuals or not.”); Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the 
Establishment Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 463, 483 (1994) (referring to the coercion 
standards as a “constitutional safety net”). 
 205. 505 U.S. 577 (1992). 
 206. See id. at 580, 599. 
 207. Id. at 587. 
 208. Id. at 588, 590. 
2018] PLAYING OUTSIDE THE JOINTS 599 
 
participate in the prayer, while the graduation setting placed peer 
pressure on attendees.209  This peer pressure was enough to indirectly 
coerce teenagers to stand for the prayer, thereby appearing to conform 
to the religious exercise.210  Further, the fact that the ceremony was 
legally voluntary was not sufficient to overcome the coercive nature of 
the prayer.211  Graduation ceremonies provide intangible benefits to 
high school students, and “[i]t is a tenet of the First Amendment that 
the State cannot require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her rights 
and benefits as the price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored 
religious practice.”212  Thus, the state could not require students to 
choose between either appearing to participate in the religious exercise 
or forfeiting the intangible benefits associated with graduation.213 
Justice Scalia dissented, arguing that coercion violates the Establishment 
Clause only if it is supported “by force of law and threat of penalty.”214  
Incorporating clergy-delivered prayer at a graduation ceremony could not 
violate the Establishment Clause because attendance was not legally 
required and failure to stand for the prayer was not backed by threat of 
penalty.215  If taken to its logical conclusion, this understanding of coercion 
would permit virtually all forms of symbolic endorsement.216 
At any given time, the Court may utilize any of these tests to scrutinize 
an alleged Establishment Clause violation.217  The rest of this Section 
explores the relationship between the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause.  Section I.E.1 explores cases in which the Court found a 
religious accommodation permissible under the Establishment Clause.218  
                                               
 209. Id. at 593. 
 210. See id. (noting that “standing or remaining silent can signify adherence to a view”). 
 211. See id. at 594–95 (finding no real choice existed for the teenage petitioner who 
wished to attend her own graduation). 
 212. Id. at 596. 
 213. Id. at 595. 
 214. Id. at 640 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The deeper flaw in the Court’s opinion does 
not lie in its wrong answer to the question whether there was state-induced ‘peer-
pressure’ coercion; it lies, rather, in the Court’s making violation of the Establishment 
Clause hinge on such a precious question.  The coercion that was a hallmark of 
historical establishments of religion was coercion of religious orthodoxy and of 
financial support by force of law and threat of penalty.”). 
 215. See id. at 640–42. 
 216. See Gey, supra note 204, at 506–07 (rejecting Justice Scalia’s suggestion that the 
prayer was constitutional because it was nonsectarian). 
 217. See id. at 467 (“The case law is littered with tests and guidelines that were 
intended to clarify the line separating church and state but which succeeded only in 
creating new disputes.”). 
 218. See infra Section I.E.1. 
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Section I.E.2 explores cases in which the Court found a religious 
accommodation impermissible under the Establishment Clause.219 
1. Playing between the joints 
Though the religion clauses of the Constitution share the “common 
purpose of securing religious liberty,”220 they are fixed in diametrical 
opposition—“both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of 
which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the 
other.”221  If the government may not advance religion in any way, it 
must not provide accommodation from laws that burden religious 
exercise, thereby forcing the government to violate the Free Exercise 
Clause.  On the other hand, if the government is unable to interfere with 
religious exercise in any way, it must provide religious accommodations 
even where they have the effect of advancing religion, thereby violating 
the Establishment Clause.  To avoid these logical extremes, the Supreme 
Court has made clear that there must be “room for play in the joints 
productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise 
to exist without sponsorship and without interference.”222 
The Court has repeatedly confirmed the fundamental principle of 
neutrality:  to remain within the “joints productive of benevolent 
neutrality,” the government may not favor religion over non-religion or 
favor one religion over others.223  Neutrality ensures all members of society, 
not just those subscribing to the majoritarian orthodoxy, are afforded 
religious liberty.  The purpose of neutrality, as Justice Brennan noted: 
   
                                               
 219. See infra Section I.E.2. 
 220. Weisman, 505 U.S. at 605 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
 221. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668–69 (1970). 
 222. Id. at 669. 
 223. Id.  In 1992, Justice Souter recognized that in the preceding forty-five years, 
the Court had not strayed from the fundamental principle of neutrality.  See Weisman, 
505 U.S. at 610 (Souter, J., concurring).  Since then, the Court has disregarded the 
neutrality principle in only one decision, Town of Greece v. Galloway, which upheld 
legislative prayer.  See 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1823 (2014) (rejecting the argument that 
legislative prayer must be nonsectarian under historical perspective analysis).  There, 
the Court rested its decision on the understanding that the practice of opening 
legislative sessions with prayer was firmly settled history, beginning with the First 
Congress.  See id. at 1818–19.  Thus, this analysis is not likely to be utilized in the context 
of employment discrimination, lest the Court apostatize the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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is not only that government may not be overtly hostile to religion but 
also that it may not place its prestige, coercive authority, or resources 
behind a single religious faith or behind religious belief in general, 
compelling nonadherents to support the practices or proselytizing 
of favored religious organizations and conveying the message that 
those who do not contribute gladly are less than full members of the 
community.224 
Therefore, while the government must remain neutral between religion 
and non-religion, and neutral between religious sects, the First 
Amendment does not require the government to completely separate 
itself from religion.  Rather, so long as it acts neutrally, the government 
may accommodate religious exercise.225  Thus, while the Court has moved 
beyond strict separation by recognizing that some religious accommodations 
are permissible, neutrality serves to temper these accommodations.226 
The government remains neutral when it provides relief from a 
government created burden on religious exercise, so long as the 
availability of that relief is independent of the claimant’s religious 
denomination.  For example, in Cutter v. Wilkinson,227 the Court rejected 
a facial challenge to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA),228 which provides prisoners an 
exemption from prison policies that substantially burden their religious 
exercise.229  The Court held that RLUIPA has the permissible primary 
purpose of alleviating government created burdens on religious 
exercise.230  Further, RLUIPA did not differentiate between religious 
                                               
 224. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 9 (1989) (illustrating how the 
purpose and effects prong of the Lemon test ensure government neutrality). 
 225. See Weisman, 505 U.S. at 627 (Souter, J., concurring) (“That government must 
remain neutral in matters of religion does not foreclose it from ever taking religion 
into account.  The State may ‘accommodate’ the free exercise of religion by relieving 
people from generally applicable rules that interfere with their religious callings.”). 
 226. See Walz, 397 U.S. at 669–70 (“Adherence to the policy of neutrality that derives 
from an accommodation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses has 
prevented the kind of involvement that would tip the balance toward government 
control of churches or governmental restraint on religious practice.”). 
 227. 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
 228. Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2012)). 
 229. Cutter, 544 U.S. at 719–20. 
 230. Id. at 720; see also Corp. of Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987) (“Where, as here, government acts 
with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of religion, 
we see no reason to require that the exemption comes packaged with benefits to 
secular entities.”). 
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sects; exemptions are provided regardless of the objector’s religious 
denomination.231  Therefore, at least facially, RLUIPA falls within the 
“joints productive of a benevolent neutrality.”232  However, the Court 
made clear that inmates should bring an as-applied challenge if 
RLUIPA exemptions favor religious interests over others by either 
imposing unjustified burdens on other inmates or jeopardizing the 
functioning of the prison.233  Thus, a statute must be facially neutral, 
and it must remain neutral in its application. 
2. Playing outside the joints 
The government’s attempt to accommodate religion oversteps the 
bounds of neutrality, and thereby violates the Establishment Clause, if 
its action has the effect of compelling one citizen to conform to the 
religious practices of another.234  It is a fundamental principle that the 
First Amendment “gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of 
their own interests others must conform their conduct to his own 
religious necessities.”235  When the government enacts a statute that 
has the effect of forcing non-adherents to conform to the religious 
beliefs of another, it places religious interests above all others, and it 
has the primary effect of advancing or endorsing religion.236 
In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.,237 the Supreme Court held a 
statute that prohibited employers from requiring employees to work 
on their Sabbath violated the Establishment Clause.238  Under the 
Lemon test, this statute had the effect of advancing religion by imposing 
an absolute duty on employers and employees to conform to the 
                                               
 231. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 724 (noting that RLUIPA “confers no privileged status on any 
particular religious sect, and singles out no bona fide faith for disadvantageous treatment”). 
 232. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1990); see id. at 720 (“[W]e hold that 
§ 3 of RLUIPA fits within the corridor between the Religion Clauses:  On its face, the 
Act qualifies as a permissible legislative accommodation of religion that is not barred 
by the Establishment Clause.”). 
 233. Id. at 726. 
 234. The fear that the government might force citizens to adopt or participate in a 
particular religion is at the heart of the Establishment Clause.  See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 
757–58 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (statement of Rep. Madison) (believing that “the 
people feared one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine together, and 
establish a religion to which they would compel others to conform”). 
 235. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (quoting 
Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953)). 
 236. See id. at 711 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority that 
Connecticut’s Sabbath law violated the Establishment Clause). 
 237. 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
 238. Id. at 710–11 (majority opinion). 
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religious practices of its religious employees.239  The statute took no 
account of the employer’s interests or the interests of employees who 
did not observe the same Sabbath.240  Specifically, it did not provide an 
exception for circumstances under which compliance would impose a 
substantial economic burden on the employer or significant burdens 
on employees required to work in the place of the Sabbath observer.241  
Therefore, the statute placed religious interests over all others.242  
Further, even under the endorsement test, the statute violated the 
Establishment Clause.243  Although the statute did not have the primary 
purpose of endorsing religion, it had the primary effect of endorsing 
religion over non-religion and the religion of one employee over the 
religions of others who have a different Sabbath.244 
The Court has permitted a religious accommodation that had the 
effect of compelling a third party to conform to religious beliefs, but 
only where necessary to prevent the government from interfering with 
a church’s ability to define its religious mission.  In Corporation of 
Presiding Bishop of The Church of Jesus Crist of Latter-day Saints v. Amos,245 
the Court upheld § 702 of Title VII, which exempts churches from 
Title VII’s prohibition on employment discrimination on the basis of 
religion.246  The majority noted that an exemption is “not 
unconstitutional simply because it allows churches to advance religion, 
which is their very purpose.”247  In Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran 
Church and School v. EEOC,248 the Court held that the Free Exercise 
Clause and the Establishment Clause require a ministerial exception 
to Title VII.249  The Free Exercise Clause protects a church’s right to 
shape its own faith and mission through appointing ministers who 
                                               
 239. See id. at 708–09 (emphasizing that, through the law, the state “command[ed] that 
Sabbath religious concerns automatically control over all secular interests at the workplace”). 
 240. Id. at 709. 
 241. See id. at 709–10. 
 242. Id. at 710. 
 243. See id. at 711–12 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (applying the endorsement test). 
 244. See id. at 711 (“The statute singles out Sabbath observers for special and . . . absolute 
protection without according similar accommodation to ethical and religious beliefs and 
practices of other private employees . . . .  The message conveyed is one of endorsement of 
a particular religious belief, to the detriment of those who do not share it.”). 
 245. 483 U.S. 327 (1987). 
 246. See id. at 329–30 (upholding the validity of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a) (2012)). 
 247. See id. at 337 (concluding that a law is invalid if “the government itself has 
advanced religion through its own activities and influence”). 
 248. 565 U.S. 171 (2012). 
 249. See id. at 188–89. 
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“personify its beliefs,” while the Establishment Clause prevents the 
government from entangling itself “in such ecclesiastical decisions.”250  
Thus, these cases represent a very narrow exception to the rule that 
religious accommodation cannot compel third party conformity. 
In addition to forbidding the government from compelling third 
party conformance, the Court has repeatedly relied on Estate of 
Thornton for the proposition that the application of religious 
accommodation statutes such as RFRA must not impose unjustified 
burdens on third parties251 and for the proposition that religious 
accommodations must not override other significant interests.252  In 
such cases, the Court easily found that the requested religious 
accommodations did not burden any third parties and, therefore, had 
no opportunity to set a standard for determining whether such a 
burden is unjustified.253  As argued below, the principle of neutrality 
prohibits courts from balancing the religious interests of a private citizen 
against the religious or secular interests of another.  Therefore, the Court’s 
reliance on Estate of Thornton for asserting otherwise is misplaced.254 
II.    ANALYZING THE APPLICATION OF RFRA TO TITLE VII  
UNDER THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
On its face, RFRA is a constitutional accommodation of religious 
exercise because Congress acted with the permissible purpose of 
alleviating a burden on religious exercise.255  However, as applied to 
                                               
 250. Id. 
 251. See Holt v. Hobbs, 135 S. Ct. 853, 867 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) 
(agreeing that RLUIPA required an exemption from prison grooming policy on the 
understanding that this exemption would not “detrimentally affect others who do not 
share petitioner’s belief”); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 
n.37 (2014) (accepting that courts must, in applying RFRA, “take adequate account of 
the burdens a requested accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries,” and that 
this will inform the compelling interest and least restrictive means analysis of RFRA 
(quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005))); Cutter, 544 U.S. at 726 
(noting that if a facially permissible religious exemption imposed unjustified burdens 
on third parties, an as-applied challenge would be appropriate). 
 252. See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722 (construing Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. as 
invalidating a law because it “‘unyielding[ly] weigh[ted]’ the interests of Sabbatarians 
‘over all other interests’”). 
 253. See, e.g., id. at 720 (devoting one sentence to declaring that nothing on the face 
of RLUIPA “founder[s] on [the] shoals our prior decisions have identified” and 
referencing Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc.). 
 254. See infra Section II.B.1. 
 255. See 42 U.S.C § 2000bb (2012) (explaining the purpose of the act is to relieve 
substantial burdens imposed by neutral laws of general applicability); Cutter, 544 U.S. 
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Title VII, RFRA constitutes an impermissible endorsement of religion.  
This Section argues that applying RFRA as construed by the Supreme 
Court violates the Establishment Clause in two ways.  First, applying 
RFRA to Title VII constitutes a government action that coerces LGBT 
employees to conform to their employers’ religious beliefs.  Second, 
RFRA accommodations from Title VII violate the principle of 
neutrality and are therefore impermissible endorsements. 
A.   The Supreme Court’s Construction of RFRA Represents an Extreme 
Expansion of Religious Liberty that Coerces Religious Conformance 
This Section argues that the Supreme Court’s construction of RFRA 
expands the scope of religious accommodations beyond what Congress 
intended.  Further, applying this construction to Title VII constitutes a 
government action that coerces religious conformance.  Using Harris 
Funeral Homes, this Section argues that the United States District Court for 
the Eastern District of Michigan accurately applied RFRA as construed by 
the Supreme Court, and this application constitutes a government action 
that coerced Stephens to conform to Rost’s religious beliefs. 
1. O Centro requires stricter scrutiny than pre-Smith cases 
In O Centro, the Court held that the government must demonstrate 
that it has a compelling interest beyond the mere interest in a uniform 
application of the law.  Further, it held that the government must 
demonstrate that providing a religious exemption to the particular 
claimant would undermine the achievement of that compelling 
interest.256  At first glance, this interpretation might not provoke 
concern, but upon further inspection, it is apparent that it marks the 
                                               
at 720 (holding RLUIPA constitutional on its face because Congress acted with the 
permissible purpose of alleviating a burden on religious exercise).  But see City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536–37 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“In my 
opinion, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993  . . . is a ‘law respecting an 
establishment of religion’ that violates the First Amendment to the Constitution.  If 
the historic landmark on the hill in Boerne happened to be a museum or an art gallery 
owned by an atheist, it would not be eligible for an exemption from the city ordinances 
that forbid an enlargement of the structure . . . .  [T]he statute has provided the 
Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or agnostic can obtain.  This governmental 
preference for religion, as opposed to irreligion, is forbidden by the First 
Amendment.” (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52–55, (1985))). 
 256. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
435–37 (2006) (distinguishing the case at bar from others in which the government 
demonstrated that permitting exemptions would “seriously compromise [the 
government’s] ability to administer the program”). 
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beginning of a broad expansion of RFRA protection.  This compelling 
interest analysis seems to align with the text of RFRA, which permits 
the government to substantially burden a person’s religious exercise 
only if it demonstrates that the “application of the burden to the 
person” is in furtherance of a compelling interest.257  Additionally, it 
appears in harmony with the purpose of RFRA, as the Court rests its 
decision on the reasoning it employed in Yoder, a case specifically 
mentioned in the text of RFRA.258  However, leading up to Smith, the 
Court was inconsistent in how it applied the compelling interest test to 
particular cases.259  For example, in Sherbert, which is also cited in the 
text of RFRA, the Court did not require the government to 
demonstrate that application of the challenged government action to 
the person served its compelling interest.260  Thus, the cases mentioned 
in the text of RFRA do not delineate a clear requirement that courts 
apply this construction of the compelling interest test.  Further, this 
construction conflicts with Congress’s expectation that the courts 
would rely on pre-Smith precedent as a whole and apply a compelling 
interest test that is no more or less stringent than that precedent sets 
forth.261  Thus, the Court began its initial expansion of RFRA by 
construing it to require this stringent compelling interest analysis as 
opposed to the broader analysis also used in pre-Smith cases. 
   
                                               
 257. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b). 
 258. See O Centro, 546 U.S. at 430–31; see also § 2000bb(b)(1) (explaining that one 
purpose of RFRA is “to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)”). 
 259. See Matthew Nicholson, Note, Is O Centro a Sign of Hope for RFRA Claimants?, 
95 VA. L. REV. 1281, 1288–93 (2009) (discussing two different compelling interest tests 
used by the Court prior to Smith); see also supra notes 69–79 and accompanying text. 
 260. In Sherbert v. Verner, South Carolina denied Sherbert unemployment benefits 
because she refused to accept employment that would require her to work on her 
Sabbath.  See 374 U.S. 398, 399–401 (1963).  The state argued that it had a compelling 
interest in preventing fraudulent claims that burden employers and might reduce the 
amount of available unemployment funds.  Id. at 407.  In considering whether the state 
had a compelling interest, the Court never questioned whether the state’s interest was 
served by denying the benefits to Sherbert, as the Court in O Centro implies.  Compare id. at 
408–09 (noting that there was no evidence to suggest that providing religious exemptions 
in general would make the benefits scheme unworkable), with O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431 
(asserting that in both Yoder and Sherbert, the “Court looked beyond broadly formulated 
interests justifying the general applicability of government mandates and scrutinized the 
asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants”). 
 261. See supra notes 102–105 and accompanying text. 
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2. Hobby Lobby eliminates the substantial burden analysis and pits the 
       rights of corporations against the rights of employees 
In Hobby Lobby, the Court expanded RFRA in two ways.  First, the 
Court held that closely held, for-profit corporations can exercise 
religion and that their religious exercise is protected under RFRA.262  
In doing so, the Court candidly broke from its practice of deferring to 
pre-Smith precedent.263  The Court doubted that Congress meant to 
restrict RFRA’s statutory development to an “ossified” version of First 
Amendment case law.264  Thus, the Court intentionally established a 
new RFRA jurisprudence, untethered to the Constitution. 
Second, the Court abdicated its authority to measure the 
substantiality of the government’s burden on religious exercise, and 
thereby eliminated the threshold question to determine whether 
RFRA applies.265  The Court held that its narrow function in 
determining whether religious exercise is substantially burdened is to 
determine whether the line drawn between the religious belief and 
objectionable act is “an honest conviction.”266  In doing so, the Court 
repurposed the honest conviction test set forth in Thomas—used to 
determine whether a belief is religious—for the substantial burden test 
that Congress set forth in RFRA—used to determine if RFRA applies.267  
                                               
 262. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2769–75 (2014) 
(rejecting multiple arguments for why for-profit corporations cannot exercise religion). 
 263. See id. at 2772–74 (“HHS argues that RFRA did no more than codify this Court’s 
pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause precedents . . . .  This argument has many flaws.”). 
 264. See id. at 2773 (“[T]he results would be absurd if RFRA merely restored this 
Court’s pre-Smith decisions in ossified form and did not allow a plaintiff to raise a RFRA 
claim unless that plaintiff fell within a category of plaintiffs one of whom had brought 
a free-exercise claim that this Court entertained in the years before Smith.”). 
 265. As Justice Ginsburg points out in her dissent, RFRA distinguishes between 
factual allegations that a party’s beliefs are religious—which the court must accept as 
true—and the legal conclusion that a party’s religious exercise is substantially 
burdened—which the court must decide.  Id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Thus, 
the Court relinquished its authority to draw the necessary legal conclusion to 
determine whether RFRA’s protection has attached to a given religious exercise.  The 
hypocrisy in this analysis should not be lost:  while the Court lacks the capacity to 
determine the substantiality of the burden on religious exercise, it has the capacity to 
determine whether a different government action would be less burdensome. 
 266. Id. at 2779 (majority opinion) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t 
Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981)). 
 267. See supra notes 43–51 and accompanying text.  There are, indeed, similarities 
between the government’s argument in Hobby Lobby that the contraceptive mandate 
does not impose a substantial burden and the reasoning employed by the Indiana 
Supreme Court in Thomas to determine that Thomas had not quit his job for religious 
reasons.  Compare Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2777, with Thomas, 450 U.S. at 712–13 
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This analysis ignores pre-Smith cases in which the Court found that the 
government’s burden on religious exercise was incidental or indirect 
when it did not require the claimant to participate in the direct act that 
violated his religious beliefs.268  By ignoring these cases, the Court 
ignored Congress’s expectation that it would use pre-Smith case law to 
determine the substantiality of the burden.269  Thus, notwithstanding 
Congress’s intent, the Court’s construction of RFRA requires courts to 
apply strict scrutiny to every religious claim—so long as the person 
honestly believes their religious exercise is substantially burdened.270 
By expanding RFRA protections to corporations, the Court effectively 
provided exemptions from laws specifically designed to circumscribe 
corporate power and protect individuals from harmful corporate 
conduct.271  In doing so, the Court has pitted the rights of corporations 
against the rights of its employees.  And, because it also eliminated the 
substantial burden requirement, RFRA will always require courts to apply 
strict scrutiny so long as the corporation says that it honestly believes the 
government has substantially burdened its religious exercise.272 
                                               
(discussing the Indiana Supreme Court’s holding that denying Thomas 
unemployment benefits was only an indirect burden on his religious exercise).  
However, these cases presented the Court with two different questions.  In Thomas, the 
Court was called upon to determine whether Thomas was exercising religion when he 
quit his job, to which the Court held he was, even if the connection between the 
objectionable act and his religion seemed unreasonable.  See 450 U.S. at 714 (“The 
determination of what is a ‘religious’ belief or practice is more often than not a 
difficult and delicate task . . . .  However, the resolution of that question is not to turn 
upon a judicial perception of that particular belief or practice in question; religious 
beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in 
order to merit First Amendment protection.”).  In Hobby Lobby, the Court was called upon 
to determine whether the religious belief was substantially burdened, to which the Court 
abdicated its authority to determine by relying on Thomas.  See 134 S. Ct. at 2778–79. 
 268. See supra notes 62–68 and accompanying text.  Though Justice Ginsburg 
referred to this precedent to suggest that the Court has the authority to measure the 
substantiality of the burden, she failed to distinguish the issue in Hobby Lobby from that 
in Thomas.  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2798–99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (focusing 
on Bowen as pre-Smith jurisprudence). 
 269. See supra notes 100–105 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s expectations). 
 270. The word “substantially” was added to clarify which government actions courts 
should apply the compelling interest test to.  See 139 CONG. REC. 26180 (statement of 
Sen. Hatch) (“[RFRA] does not require the Government to justify every action that 
has some effect on religious exercise.”).  Thus, whether RFRA applies depends on 
whether the religious exercise was substantially burdened. 
 271. See Sepper, supra note 11. 
 272. Though the government could question whether the belief is sincerely held, it 
rarely does so.  See Frederick Mark Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens:  How Courts May (and 
Why They Must) Judge Burdens on Religion Under RFRA, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 94, 110 
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Moreover, the majority’s dictum on Title VII, suggesting that 
Title VII would pass RFRA scrutiny, fails to solidify protection from all 
forms of employment discrimination.273  First, this dicta ignores the 
O Centro framework, which repudiates broad categorical government 
interests and requires the government to show that applying the law to 
the person serves its compelling interest.274  Further, unlike race, which 
is clearly an immutable characteristic, some judges believe that LGBT 
status is a choice.275  Even if courts do not view LGBT status as a choice, 
the outward projection of this status is partially within control of the 
employee.276  Therefore, rather than requiring the employer to maintain 
a flamboyant LGBT employee, a less restrictive alternative is to require 
the employee to present in a more hetero-normative or cis-normative 
manner.  Thus, the government will not satisfy RFRA unless it requires 
the LGBT employee to conform to the religious beliefs of his employer 
by adopting a religiously-approved lifestyle or appearance. 
The district court’s decision in Harris Funeral Homes affirms this 
outcome.  Section II.A.3 argues that the district court’s decision is 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent and the district court, therefore, 
properly provided Rost a religious accommodation from Title VII.  Section 
II.A.4 argues that, as evidenced by Harris Funeral Homes, granting the 
religious accommodation constitutes a government action that compels 
LGBT employees to conform to their employer’s religious tenets.277 
3. RFRA mandates religious accommodations from Title VII’s ban on sex 
      discrimination 
The district court’s decision in Harris Funeral Homes, continues the 
trend of diverging away from Congress’s intent to establish a pre-Smith 
interpretation of RFRA, and is consistent with Hobby Lobby.  First, the 
district court properly found that the EEOC substantially burdened the 
funeral home’s religious exercise because it found that Rost honestly 
                                               
(2017) (explaining that the government lost in the only two cases in which it 
questioned the sincerity of religious belief). 
 273. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2783 (majority opinion) (making a broad 
declaration that “[t]he Government has a compelling interest in providing an equal 
opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions 
on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal”). 
 274. See supra notes 108–111 and accompanying text. 
 275. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 276. Id. 
 277. See infra Section II.A.4. 
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believed the EEOC did so.278  That is precisely what the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Hobby Lobby requires.279  After assuming the EEOC 
had a compelling interest, the district court properly applied the 
narrower least restrictive alternative analysis as set forth in O Centro and 
applied in Hobby Lobby.280  Unlike the Sixth Circuit, the district court 
did not find itself beholden to the Hobby Lobby dicta.281  Rather, it 
required the EEOC to demonstrate that it sought the least restrictive 
means of enforcing Title VII “to the person,” which the EEOC failed 
to do.282  Thus, the district court correctly provided Rost a religious 
accommodation from Title VII. 
The Sixth Circuit’s reversal diverged from Supreme Court 
precedent.283  Though the Sixth Circuit avoided an Establishment 
Clause confrontation, for better or worse, its analysis does not apply 
RFRA as construed by the Supreme Court.284  First, the court 
disregarded the ruling in Hobby Lobby that the narrow function of the 
court in determining whether religious exercise is substantially 
burdened is to determine whether the line drawn between the belief 
and objectionable act is an honest conviction.285  Instead, the Sixth 
Circuit found that the district court substituted a religious belief for a 
legal conclusion when it ended its inquiry after finding the claimant 
honestly believed the government substantially burdened his religious 
                                               
 278. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 855 (E.D. 
Mich. 2016), rev’d, 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. docketed, No. 18-107 (U.S. 
July 24, 2018) (noting that Rost sincerely believes that permitting a biological male 
employee to wear a skirt-suit violates “God’s commands” because it supports the notion 
“that sex is a changeable social construct,” and therefore holding that requiring Rost to 
permit Stephens to wear a skirt-suit would substantially burden his religious exercise). 
 279. See supra notes 116–122 and accompanying text. 
 280. Harris Funeral Homes, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 860 (citing Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2780 (2014)) (noting that RFRA “requires the government 
to ‘sho[w] that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a 
substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting part[y]’”). 
 281. Id. at 857 (“This Court does not read that paragraph as indicating that a RFRA 
defense can never prevail as a defense to Title VII or that Title VII is exempt from the 
focused analysis set forth by the majority.  If that were the case, the majority would 
presumably have said so. It did not.”). 
 282. Id. at 860. 
 283. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 884 F.3d 560, 585–90, 595 
(6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. docketed, No. 18-107 (U.S. July 24, 2018). 
 284. By denying the RFRA defense, the court did not require Stephens to conform to 
the religious beliefs of Rost, and therefore did not transgress the Establishment Clause.  
Further, the court declined to consider the Establishment Clause arguments raised in 
several amici because the parties did not raise these arguments below.  Id. at 585 n.8.  
 285. See supra notes 118–121 and accompanying text. 
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exercise.286  This finding mirrors Justice Ginsburg’s rigorous dissent in 
Hobby Lobby, and is irreconcilable with the majority’s ruling.287  Further, 
the Sixth Circuit relied on the nonbinding Hobby Lobby dicta to assume 
that Title VII was narrowly tailored.288  Therefore, even if the EEOC 
substantially burdened Rost’s religious exercise, RFRA still did not 
provide Rost a religious accommodation from Title VII.289 
The Sixth Circuit’s decision does not reflect the current 
construction of RFRA because the circuit court misapplied the 
substantial burden analysis as directed by the Hobby Lobby decision and 
it assumed Title VII was the least restrictive means of furthering the 
EEOC’s compelling interest.  Because the Sixth Circuit disregarded 
Supreme Court precedent and misapplied RFRA, the rest of this 
section uses the district court’s decision to demonstrate that, in the 
context of employment discrimination, applying the Supreme Court’s 
current construction of RFRA constitutes a government action that 
compels LGBT employees to conform to the religious ideology of their 
employer, and thereby violates the Establishment Clause. 
4. Applying RFRA as construed by the Supreme Court constitutes a 
       government action that coerces LGBT employees to conform 
Under the coercion test set forth in Weisman,290 the district court’s 
application of RFRA to Title VII in Harris Funeral Homes is a 
government action that coerced Stephens to engage in Rost’s religious 
exercise.  According to the court, Stephens could have her job back 
but only if she wore gender-neutral attire.291  Thus, the court required 
that Stephens either conform to Rost’s religious beliefs or forfeit her 
right to the intangible and tangible benefits of employment.  Further, 
though Stephens is an adult and may not be so vulnerable as to 
succumb to peer pressure to conform,292 RFRA allowed the court to apply 
                                               
 286. Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d at 585. 
 287. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2787, 2792 (2014) 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that RFRA distinguishes between factual allegations 
that a claimant’s beliefs are sincere and of a religious nature and legal conclusions that 
the government substantially burdened religious exercise). 
 288. See Harris Funeral Homes, 884 F.3d at 595. 
 289. Id. 
 290. See supra notes 205–215. 
 291. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 863 
n.20 (E.D. Mich. 2016), rev’d, 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. docketed, No. 
18-107 (U.S. July 24, 2018). 
 292. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992) (relying on the vulnerability of teenagers 
to hold that the state could not indirectly coerce teenagers to stand for religious prayers). 
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much more than just peer pressure.  Permitting Rost to utilize both RFRA 
and the federal courts was to permit him to “employ the machinery of the 
[federal government] to enforce religious orthodoxy.”293 
Additionally, the court’s application of RFRA to Stephens’s Title VII 
claim bears the “imprint” of the federal government.294  RFRA does not 
say that individuals should conform to the religious ideology of others.  It 
was the district court’s application of RFRA, as construed by the Supreme 
Court, that led to this outcome.  In applying the least restrictive alternative 
test, the district court determined what degree of conformance RFRA 
legally required before Title VII would protect Stephens.295  Once the 
district court determined what degree of conformance was required, it 
presented Stephens with a choice of conforming to Rost’s religious views 
of gender expression or losing her job and all of the tangible and 
intangible benefits that go along with it.296  Thus, whether Congress 
intended to coerce religious conformance or not, implementing the 
statute as construed by the Supreme Court has this effect.297 
Further, even under Justice Scalia’s theory of coercion in Weisman, the 
district court’s application of RFRA to Stephens’s Title VII claim legally 
coerced Stephens to conform to Rost’s religious beliefs.298  The court’s 
judgment created both a force of law and a penalty.  First, by determining 
the least restrictive means to achieve the EEOC’s interest, the court’s 
decision acts as a force of law, demarcating the bounds of conformance to 
which Rost may legally subject Stephens.  Further, the court’s decision 
forces Stephens to conform to Rost’s religious beliefs under threat of losing 
her job—should Stephens refuse to adhere to Rost’s religious beliefs by 
wearing female clothing, Rost may legally terminate her employment.299  
                                               
 293. Id. at 592. 
 294. Id. at 590 (holding that a public school’s forcing students to stand for prayer violated 
the First Amendment’s prohibition against the favoring of one religion over others). 
 295. Harris Funeral Homes, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 861–62 (noting that if the EEOC truly 
had a compelling interest in ensuring Stephens was not subject to gender stereotypes, 
then requiring Stephens to adhere to a gender-neutral dress code is a less restrictive 
alternative that serves the EEOC’s interest better than requiring Rost to permit 
Stephens to wear a skirt). 
 296. Id. at 863 n.20. 
 297. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The 
relevant issue is whether an objective observer, acquainted with the text, legislative 
history, and implementation of the statute, would perceive it as a state endorsement 
of prayer in public schools.”). 
 298. See supra notes 214–216 and accompanying text. 
 299. Harris Funeral Homes, 201 F. Supp. 3d at 863. 
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Thus, even under the most conservative theory of coercion, applying RFRA 
to Title VII contravenes the Establishment Clause. 
B.   Religious Accommodation from Title VII Falls Outside the Joints 
Productive of Benevolent Neutrality 
The religious accommodations that RFRA carves out of Title VII 
violate the principle of neutrality.  First, this Section argues that, 
notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s indication otherwise, the 
principle of neutrality prevents courts from balancing one citizen’s 
religious interests against another citizen’s secular or religious 
interests.  Therefore, the correct interpretation of Estate of Thornton 
admonishes religious accommodations that permit one citizen to 
compel or coerce another citizen to conform to his religious tenets.  
Using Harris Funeral Homes, this Section argues that a RFRA 
accommodation from Title VII violates the principle of neutrality 
because it permits an employer to compel a LGBT employee to 
conform to the employer’s religious orthodoxy. 
1. The principle of neutrality precludes balancing the interests of third parties 
The Supreme Court’s reliance on its decision in Estate of Thornton as 
admonishing unjustified burdens on third party interests is 
misplaced.300  This interpretation implies that courts have the authority 
to balance the religious interests of one citizen against the religious or 
secular interests of another.  This section argues that any attempt to 
balance religious and secular burdens between citizens violates the 
principle of neutrality.  Instead, the Court should rely on Estate of 
Thornton as prohibiting the government from providing religious 
accommodations that permit one citizen to coerce or compel another 
citizen to conform to his religious beliefs.301 
The Court has not had an opportunity to clarify how it will balance the 
religious interest of one citizen against the religious or secular interests of 
another, but its Hobby Lobby opinion contains enlightening dicta.302  Both 
                                               
 300. There, the Court struck down a statute that compelled secular employers and 
employees to conform to the religious beliefs of religious employees.  See Estate of 
Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985). 
 301. Id. at 710. 
 302. The Hobby Lobby case nearly presented the Court with the opportunity to clarify 
how it will balance these interests when the least restrictive alternative, which RFRA 
requires, burdens third parties.  By not providing coverage for the contested forms of 
birth control, the corporations in Hobby Lobby would have burdened their female 
employees’ reproductive choices if this coverage was not otherwise available without 
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the majority and Justice Kennedy proffer balancing frameworks that fly in 
the face of neutrality and the Establishment Clause.303 
The majority in Hobby Lobby conceded that in applying RFRA, courts 
must “take adequate account of the burdens a requested 
accommodation may impose on nonbeneficiaries.”304  Under its view, 
however, simply framing a statute as conferring a benefit on third 
parties does not preclude an employer from receiving a religious 
accommodation.305  Otherwise, the government could render RFRA 
inoperable by framing all regulations as benefiting third parties.306  For 
example, this would permit the government to require that all 
restaurants remain open on Saturdays to give employees an 
opportunity to earn tips, and thereby exclude any person whose 
Sabbath is on Saturday from owning a restaurant.307  Instead, third 
party burdens only guide the compelling interest and least restrictive 
means analysis of RFRA.308 
Yet, the majority provided no standard for determining which third 
party burdens are sufficient to outweigh a claimant’s interest in 
religious exercise or which religious interests are sufficient to justify 
burdening third parties.309  Simply using third party burdens to guide 
the compelling interest and least restrictive means analyses requires 
courts to judge the third party’s interests in relation to the objector’s 
religious interests.  Thus, if the reviewing court ultimately grants a 
religious exemption, it favors religious interests over others, thereby 
violating the principle of neutrality.310  Additionally, the majority’s 
holding that it lacked the capacity to measure the burden on religious 
                                               
additional cost; but, because the Court ultimately found that the government had a 
readily available, less restrictive alternative that did not impact any third party, we are left 
with only dicta.  Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2781 n.37 (2014). 
 303. See supra note 302; Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2785–87 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 304. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37 (quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 
(2005)). 
 305. Id. 
 306. Id. 
 307. See id. 
 308. Id. 
 309. See id. (noting a less restrictive alternative, which did not burden third parties, 
was readily available and being used for other religious entities). 
 310. See supra notes 223–225 and accompanying text (explaining that the principle 
of neutrality prevents the government from providing religious accommodations that 
favor one religion over another, or favor religion over non-religion). 
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exercise casts doubt on whether it has the capacity to objectively 
balance these interests.311 
Though the majority rejected the argument that statutes designed 
to confer a benefit on third parties should always preclude religious 
accommodation, it did not offer any alternative.312  The majority leaves 
open the question of how courts should distinguish between a law that 
provides the benefit of working on Saturday from a law that provides 
the benefit of equal employment opportunities; or conversely, how 
courts should distinguish between religious accommodations that 
burden employees by not providing the opportunity to work on 
Saturdays, from religious accommodations that burden employees by 
subjecting them to discrimination in the work place.313 
Justice Kennedy suggests an equally paradoxical framework:  a 
religious exemption should not be granted where a person’s religious 
exercise “unduly restrict[s] other persons . . . in protecting their own 
interests, interests the law deems compelling.”314  Under this view, so 
long as the third party can defend his own compelling interests, the 
judiciary can grant a religious accommodation.315  Thus, this approach 
still requires courts to judge a third party’s interests in relation to the 
objector’s religious interests, and therefore creates the risk that a court 
will violate the principle of neutrality.316  Further, it is unclear how a court 
would determine whether an individual has a compelling interest.317   
                                               
 311. See supra notes 265–270 and accompanying text. 
 312. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781 n.37 (suggesting that prohibiting exemptions 
from laws that benefit third parties could render RFRA inoperable, but failing to clarify 
how it will balance competing interests because the government had a readily 
available, less restrictive alternative). 
 313. See id. (reasoning that if simply framing a law as benefiting third parties 
prevented religious accommodations, the government could require all restaurants to 
remain open on Saturdays to give employees the opportunity to earn tips, preventing 
persons whose Sabbath is Saturday from operating a restaurant). 
 314. Id. at 2787 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 315. See id. at 2786–87 (mentioning the Courts’ duty to balance the two interests). 
 316. See supra notes 223–225 and accompanying text (explaining that the principle 
of neutrality serves to restrain the government from taking a secular stance in terms of 
religious affiliation). 
 317. It is possible that the court would look to whether it has found similar 
government interests compelling, but this would ensure certain populations never 
have a compelling interest.  For example, the Supreme Court has never required the 
government to show that it has a compelling interest to justify discriminating against 
LGBT citizens or citizens with disabilities.  See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) 
(striking down an amendment to the Colorado state Constitution under rational basis, 
which permits the government to discriminate if it has a mere conceivable legitimate 
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The Court should not rely on its decision in Estate of Thornton as 
admonishing unjustified third party harms, which allows the judiciary 
to place its power behind religious interests.  Rather, it should rely on 
that decision as admonishing religious accommodations that permit 
one citizen to compel or coerce another to conform to his religious 
ideology.  This would shift the Court’s focus in determining whether a 
religious accommodation is permissible back to the fundamental 
principle upon which Estate of Thornton was predicated:  “The First 
Amendment . . . gives no one the right to insist that in pursuit of their 
own interests others must conform their conduct to his own religious 
necessities.”318  Additionally, this would keep Establishment Clause 
restrictions on religious accommodation abreast with Establishment 
Clause restrictions on other government actions319 and would prevent 
the Judiciary from exceeding its jurisdiction.320 
Further, this interpretation would provide a workable solution to 
determine how courts should distinguish between a law that provides 
the benefit of working on Saturday from a law that provides the benefit 
of equal employment opportunities.  An employer who closes his 
business on Saturday, does not, in pursuance of exercising his religion, 
require employees to conform to his religion; these employees are free 
to work elsewhere on Saturdays and still keep their job.  In the context 
of employment discrimination, the employer, in pursuance of 
exercising his religion, denies equal treatment unless an employee 
conforms to his religious beliefs.321  Thus, while both laws could be 
framed as benefiting third parties, courts would only deny religious 
accommodations under one law. 
                                               
interest in discriminating); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 
(1985) (using rational basis to scrutinize government action that discriminated against 
citizens with disabilities).  Though it might seem strange for an individual to claim his 
religion compels him to discriminate against people with disabilities, the court can 
neither question the veracity of that claim nor measure the burden on religious 
exercise.  See United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944); Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 
2779 (majority opinion). 
 318. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985) (quoting 
Otten v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953)). 
 319. This accords with the coercion test as set forth in Lee v. Weisman.  See 505 U.S. 
577, 587 (1992); see also supra notes 203–216 and accompanying text. 
 320. If the Court violates the principle of neutrality, it violates the Establishment 
Clause, and the court is without jurisdiction to issue any decision violative of the First 
Amendment.  See supra note 28 and accompanying text (explaining the First Amendment 
removes the authority to violate the religion clauses from all three branches). 
 321. See infra Section II.B.2. 
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2. RFRA accommodations permit employers to compel religious conformance 
       from employees 
In Harris Funeral Homes, the district court’s application of Title VII 
violated the principle of neutrality because it permitted Rost to compel 
Stephens to conform to his religious beliefs.  The district court’s 
application of RFRA mirrors the statute struck down in Estate of 
Thornton because it imposed on Stephens an absolute duty to conform 
to Rost’s religious, cis-normative view of gender.322  Unlike the statute 
struck down in Estate of Thornton, RFRA does permit the court to 
conduct a balancing test; however, this test is only designed to balance 
a citizen’s interest in exercising his religion against the government’s 
interests in regulating conduct.323  Further, even if RFRA did permit 
the court to balance Stephens’s interests, the principle of neutrality 
prevents this.324  Indeed, the court did not feign an attempt to account 
for the burdens on Stephens.325  Instead, it developed a least restrictive 
alternative by looking solely at the EEOC’s compelling interest and 
Rost’s religious objection.  Rost objected to permitting a male 
employee to dress in female clothing, and the EEOC had a compelling 
                                               
 322. See Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. at 709 (“In essence, the Connecticut statute 
imposes on employers and employees an absolute duty to conform their business 
practices to the particular religious practices of the employee by enforcing observance 
of the Sabbath the employee unilaterally designates.”). 
 323. RFRA was designed to protect citizens’ religious exercise from harmful 
government action.  See S. REP. NO. 103-111, at 8 (1993) (“To assure that all Americans 
are free to follow their faiths free from governmental interference, the committee 
finds that legislation is needed to restore the compelling interest test.”); H. REP. NO. 
103-88, at 2 (1993) (noting that the Constitution has not prevented the government 
from burdening religious exercise).  Therefore, it sets forth the standard for balancing 
the government’s interests in regulating particular conduct against a citizen’s interest 
in religious exercise—strict scrutiny.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b)(1)(2) (2012) 
(requiring that the government have a compelling interest in substantially burdening 
the religious objector’s religious exercise, and that it use the least burdensome method 
of achieving that interest).  It fails, however, to elucidate any standard for balancing 
the religious interests of one citizen against the secular or religious interests of 
another.  See id. (lacking any reference to balancing third party interests). 
 324. By balancing the religious interests of one citizen against the secular interests 
of another, the Court would violate the fundamental principle of neutrality.  See supra 
notes 223–225 and accompanying text.  Thus, even if a court finds that the EEOC has 
a compelling interest, it cannot balance third party interests in determining whether 
compliance with Title VII is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest 
without violating the Establishment Clause. 
 325. EEOC v. R.G. & G.R. Harris Funeral Homes, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 3d 837, 861–63 
(E.D. Mich. 2016), rev’d, 884 F.3d 560 (6th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. docketed, No. 18-
107 (U.S. July 24, 2018). 
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interest in eliminating gender stereotypes.326  Thus, the court’s 
solution that Rost reinstate Stephens so long as Stephens adheres to a 
gender-neutral dress-code was tailored without any consideration of 
the effect this would have on Stephens.327  This solution compels 
Stephens to conform to the religious, cis-normative views of gender 
expression that were unilaterally designated by Rost and merely 
circumscribed by the EEOC’s compelling interest (not Stephens’s).  By 
providing a religious accommodation that gives Rost the power to 
compel Stephens to conform to his religious beliefs, this application of 
RFRA exceeds the bounds of benevolent neutrality and therefore 
violates the Establishment Clause.328 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s construction of RFRA mandates sweeping 
protections of religious exercise at the expense of religious liberty.  
This broad interpretation knows no bounds and would require 
exemptions for even the most benign burdens on religious exercise.  
In particular, the Court’s construction of RFRA presents a serious 
threat to the autonomy and liberty of LGBT employees by permitting 
employers to blatantly discriminate against them. 
Applying RFRA, as construed by the Court, to Title VII’s prohibition 
on sex discrimination constitutes a government action that compels 
LGBT employees to conform to the religious orthodoxy of their 
employers.  Providing RFRA accommodations in this context forces an 
LGBT employee to choose between conforming to his employer’s 
religious hetero, cis-normative views of sexual orientation and gender 
expression or forfeiting his job and all the tangible and intangible 
benefits it provides.  Further, the compulsion to conform is 
attributable to the judiciary, not just the employer, because the 
reviewing court determines the degree to which the employee must 
conform to keep his job. 
Further, RFRA accommodations from Title VII violate the 
fundamental principle of neutrality. In granting a RFRA 
accommodation from Title VII, courts place religious interests above 
all others by permitting an employer to, in pursuit of his religious 
exercise, compel his employees to conform his religious beliefs. 
                                               
 326. Id. at 847–48, 859. 
 327. Id. at 861–63. 
 328. See supra notes 300–320 and accompanying text. 
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Religious exercise is not absolute.329  At all times, the government must 
walk the fine line traversing the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.  
By coercing LGBT employees to conform to the religious orthodoxy of 
their employer, RFRA moves beyond the zone of permissible 
accommodation into the realm of impermissible religious endorsement. 
                                               
 329. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
